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INTRODUCTION
Common law concepts have fallen into disrepute among legal theorists.
The rise of Legal Realism in the early twentieth century marked a turning
point in legal thought and analysis. One of the defining characteristics of
the movement was complete disregard, not to say contempt, towards legal
conceptualism.1 The founding fathers of the movement viewed the core
concepts of the common law as devoid of any independent meaning or
functional significance. 2 They considered the common law’s conceptual
edifice indeterminate and manipulable so as to render it altogether contingent
on the working of the system.3 Walking along the same path, efficiencyminded scholars see the common law system as a collection of rules that are
in reality motivated solely by the ideal of wealth maximization.4 In this
view, legal concepts exist in the common law to further its economic goals,
1 For a sample of the literature documenting this, see MORTON J. H ORWITZ, T HE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870–1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY
200 (1992) (“Hostility to conceptualism was a hallmark of Legal Realist criticism.”); BRIAN Z.
TAMANAHA, BEYOND THE FORMALIST–REALIST DIVIDE: THE ROLE OF POLITICS IN
JUDGING 59 (2010); Anthony Kronman, Jurisprudential Responses to Legal Realism, 73 CORNELL L.
REV. 335, 335-36 (1988); Karl Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence—The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L.
REV. 431, 447-48 (1930).
2 As a perfect example, see Felix Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach,
35 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 821 (1935) (“Legal concepts . . . are supernatural entities which do not
have a verifiable existence except to the eyes of faith.”). For work contributing to this critique, see
RICHARD A. POSNER, CARDOZO: A STUDY IN REPUTATION 45 (1990) (describing Judge
Cardozo’s use of concepts as “bluff ”); John Dewey, The Historic Background of Corporate Legal
Personality, 35 YALE L.J. 655, 655 (1926).
3 See Cohen, supra note 2, at 820; Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law
Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1699 (1976).
4 See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 270-71 (7th ed. 2007);
George L. Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules, 6 J. LEGAL STUD.
65, 65 (1977); Paul H. Rubin, Why Is the Common Law Efficient?, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 51, 53 (1977).
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or are otherwise completely redundant.5 Legal philosophers, for their part,
have chimed in as well, characterizing the common law’s concepts as
embodying their own autonomous commitment to reason, which they see as
altogether independent from the instrumental goals of the law.6 With the
general move towards instrumentalism in American legal analysis and
thinking,7 the net result has been that common law concepts are seen today
as largely vestigial artifacts.
In this Article, we mount a defense of the common law’s architecture.
We argue that the criticisms leveled by legal theorists at the common law’s
extensive use of legal concepts are misguided. In treating the common law’s
conceptual architecture as a contingent feature of the system, these criticisms
fail to account for how the common law has endured over time and context,
and in the face of changing social values and preferences. The persistence of
the common law and its continuing vitality is in large measure attributable
to the subtle balance that it achieves between stability and change, a balance
for which it relies almost entirely on its conceptual structure. Our core
thesis is that the common law’s commitment to its conceptual structure is in
many ways the key to understanding not just how the common law works
but, in addition, what the common law itself is.
For the purposes of this Article, we define common law concepts as the
operational legal devices that the common law uses in doctrine to understand and
compartmentalize aspects of a legal issue or dispute. Concepts are in effect the
building blocks of common law doctrine, its language of analysis, so to
speak. It is through its concepts that the common law strikes a balance
between stability and change, both of which are essential to the effective
operation of a legal system. A legal system needs to be sufficiently stable in
order to guide the behavior of its subjects. An ever-changing legal system
would vitiate the expectations of its subjects and force them to constantly
adjust to the oscillations of legal opinion, undermining its own legitimacy in
the process.8 At the same time, however, a legal system that remains frozen
in time would fail to respond to the changing needs of the citizenry and
5 See, e.g., WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
TORT LAW 14 (1987) (arguing that the very tort concept of “fault” has an “economic rationale” and
that the “doctrinal structure” of tort law can be seen as economic); Richard A. Posner, A Theory of
Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 32 (1972) (arguing that Learned Hand’s formulation of the duty
of care—the Hand Formula—was driven by economic considerations).
6 See, e.g., ERNEST J. WEINRIB, T HE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW (1995).
7 See Robert S. Summers, Pragmatic Instrumentalism in Twentieth Century American Legal
Thought—A Synthesis and Critique of Our Dominant General Theory About Law and Its Use, 66
CORNELL L. REV. 861, 862-63 (1981).
8 See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., “The Rule of Law” as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse, 97
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 42-43 (1997).
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would invariably run afoul of its subjects’ ideals, values, and preferences.9
Such a system too, much like the one that remains in a perpetual state of
change, is likely to lose its claim to legitimacy and prove to be ineffective.
As Justice Holmes famously said, it would be “revolting to have no better
reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry
IV.”10 Stability and change in the law, while seemingly at odds with each
other, are thus both central to a legal system’s claim to legitimacy—a
concern that the common law takes very seriously.
Common law concepts are uniquely designed to accommodate the seemingly conflicting demands of stability and change. They perform this task by
virtue of what we term their “duality of meaning.” Common law concepts
have, at once, a jural meaning and a normative meaning. The jural meaning
refers to the structural core undergirding a legal concept that enables its use
by participants in legal discourse. This jural meaning is indeed what Wesley
Hohfeld described as the “intrinsic meaning” of a legal concept in his
famous taxonomy of jural conceptions and relations. 11 While the jural
meaning forms the core of the concept, it is usually incapable of being
applied to all situations and contexts by itself, owing to its intrinsic “openendedness.” It is the normative meaning of the concept that renders it
applicable to a context. The normative meaning refers to the meaning that a
legal concept and its jural meaning come to be cloaked in as a result of
external interpretive influences, which may in turn be drawn from a variety
of situational goals. The normative meaning does not displace the jural
meaning of the concept but instead works in tandem with it to collectively
enable the concept to be applied during adjudication. Over time, the two
meanings work together, with the jural meaning producing the common
law’s stability effect while the normative meaning allows the common law to
accommodate changes in its values and goals. The jural meaning remains
stable and operates as an anchor, enabling actors to build their expectations
and plan their activities. At the same time, the open-ended nature of legal
concepts renders them capable of accommodating different normative values
and ideals. It is for this reason that most common law concepts are structured
as legal standards (as opposed to rules).12
9 See BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, T HE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 150-51 (1921);
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1-2 (Little, Brown & Co. 1923) (1881).
10 O. W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV . 457, 469 (1897).
11 Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning,
23 YALE L.J. 16, 58 (1913).
12 See, e.g., Norway Plains Co. v. Bos. & Me. R.R., 67 Mass. (1 Gray) 263, 267 (1854) (explaining
that one of the great merits of the common law is that its structure relies on a few broad and
comprehensive principles, as opposed to a series of detailed practical rules). For a discussion of
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Examples are legion. Consider, first, the concept of “duty of care” in tort
law. The core jural meaning of the concept is that an actor is under an
obligation to avoid causing harm; this obligation is deemed significant
enough to constrain his or her behavior. While scholars disagree on the
scope and reach of this obligation—that is, on whether it is general or
relative13— they generally agree on the actual structure of the duty as an
obligation, which forms the jural correlative of a claim-right.14 Despite this
common jural understanding of the concept, over the years scholars of tort
law have continued to debate what exactly it is that a duty of care connotes
as a normative matter. Some have argued that the obligation is a moral one,
imposed on individuals in society to take care (and precautions) against
causing harm to others that emanates from basic moral principles;15 others
contend that it is nothing more than a device through which the law imposes
liability on the cheapest cost avoider,16 or the party best positioned to bear
the loss.17
Consider, next, the concept of “touch and concern” in property law. The
concept of “touch and concern” is the litmus test used by courts to determine
whether a covenant binds third parties who did not directly agree to its
existence.18 As an analytical matter, the jural meaning of “touch and concern”
as a legal concept is indisputable: to bind third parties, the covenant must
be related to the realty itself (i.e., to the res). As a normative matter,
however, the concept of “touch and concern” has come to be imbued with
different normative understandings. Some argue that it is little more than a
mechanism allowing courts to police the contracting parties’ mutual intent
and to determine the extent to which a third party’s autonomy can be
rules and standards, see Ronald M. Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 14, 29
(1967); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 621 (1992);
and Kennedy, supra note 3, at 1776.
13 See, e.g., W. Jonathan Cardi & Michael D. Green, Duty Wars, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 671
(2008) (documenting the debate surrounding the concept); Dilan A. Esper & Gregory C. Keating,
Abusing “Duty,” 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 265, 282 (2006); John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C.
Zipursky, The Moral of MacPherson, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1733, 1829-30 (1998) (offering a relational
conception of duty based on “relationships”).
14 See Hohfeld, supra note 11, at 30 (describing the jural structure of rights and duties as jural
correlatives).
15 See, e.g., JULES L. COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE : I N DEFENCE OF A
PRAGMATIST APPROACH TO LEGAL THEORY 22-23 (2001); WEINRIB, supra note 6, at 123.
16 See, e.g., Guido Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay for Harry Kalven,
Jr., 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 69, 84-91 (1975); see also LANDES & POSNER, supra note 5, at 1.
17 See, e.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 900-01 (Cal. 1963) (en banc)
(imposing strict liability on a manufacturer where it was in a better position to bear the costs of
injuries than the people who were powerless to protect themselves).
18 See, e.g., THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND
POLICIES 1038-40 (2d ed. 2012).
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permissibly impaired.19 Others contend that the concept in reality works
(and ought to work) as a mechanism of efficient resource allocation, allowing
courts to weed out obligations that might be inefficient when imposed on
third parties.20 Still others point out that the concept of “touch and concern”
could have been used to undo racially restrictive covenants and that it thus
promotes the values of justice and equality. 21 Importantly, the different
normative constructions accept the jural meaning of the concept. Indeed,
despite their disagreement, all these accounts take the jural meaning of the
concept as a given. The competition among them is over the right set of
values that should animate the concept and determine how it should be
operationalized by courts.
A third example is the concept of “good faith” in contract law. The
common law of contracts has long been thought to impose an obligation of
good faith on parties in the performance and enforcement of the contract.22
While courts and scholars have maligned the concept for being too openended and uncertain,23 this criticism ignores the reality that there remains a
jural core to the concept that explains its persistence over time. Doctrinally,
good faith connotes an obligation imposed on one contracting party, and
inuring to the benefit of the other, to behave in an honest and commercially
fair manner in its contractual dealings. On account of its open-endedness,
the concept of good faith is capable of accommodating various normative

19 See, e.g., Gregory S. Alexander, Freedom, Coercion, and the Law of Servitudes, 73 CORNELL L.
REV. 883, 890-91 (1988) (presenting the two sides of the “touch and concern” debate); Richard A.
Epstein, Notice and Freedom of Contract in the Law of Servitudes, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1353, 1359-60
(1982) (arguing that the “touch and concern” requirement denies the original parties their
contractual freedom); Uriel Reichman, Toward a Unified Concept of Servitudes, 55 S. CAL. L. REV.
1177, 1233 (1982) (finding that the “touch and concern” test is beneficial as it safeguards individual
freedom as well as promotes efficiency).
20 See, e.g., Jeffrey E. Stake, Toward an Economic Understanding of Touch and Concern, 1988
DUKE L.J. 925, 930 (proposing that courts will “find that a covenant touches and concerns land
when the benefit or burden at issue is more efficiently allocated to the successors than to the
original parties to the covenant”).
21 See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, Property Law and the Rise, Life, and Demise of Racially Restrictive
Covenants 19 (Ariz. Legal Studies Discussion Paper No. 13-21, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2243028.
22 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND ) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981) (“Every contract imposes
upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement.”); see
also U.C.C. § 1-304 (2012) (“Every contract or duty within [the Uniform Commercial Code]
imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance and enforcement.” (alteration in original)).
23 See, e.g., Empire Gas Corp. v. Am. Bakeries Co., 840 F.2d 1333, 1339 (7th Cir. 1988) (calling
the good faith requirement “a chameleon”); Victor P. Goldberg, Discretion in Long-Term Open Quantity
Contracts: Reining in Good Faith, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 319, 348 (2002) (analyzing seven factually
similar cases with divergent outcomes to demonstrate “the futility of relying on a good faith standard
absent a coherent framework for understanding the transaction”).
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constructions. Hence, it is not surprising that, to some, good faith partakes
of the idea of commercial morality and fairness, implicating the ideals of
horizontal equality and fairness between the parties,24 while to others, it is
used as a proxy for the law’s realization of its intrinsic efficiency goals
relating to the regulation of contract making and enforcement.25 It is crucial
to understand, though, that the disagreement revolves around the normative
content of the concept, not its jural meaning.
As we will show, other common law concepts, including the “reasonable
person,” share the same design.26 All these concepts embody a core jural
meaning that leaves sufficient elbow room for normative, value-driven/based
constructions. It is precisely because of this reality that these concepts have
endured the test of time and remain an integral part of the common law’s
vocabulary and functioning to this day. For the same reason, common law
concepts continue to inform and play a key role in statutory reforms.27
While concepts in the common law have a relatively stable jural meaning
embedded in them, their normative meaning certainly changes over time
and context, allowing the common law as a whole to accommodate a plurality
of normative values. It is precisely through the interaction between the two
meanings that the common law itself changes. As is well known, substantive
doctrinal change in the common law (i.e., the wholesale replacement of
common law rules) is somewhat rare. The doctrinal content of the common
law thus remains relatively static.28 The elements of “trespass,” “nuisance,”
“repudiation,” “adverse possession,” and the like have remained largely the
same for ages (and in some cases centuries) now. All the same, in its actual
functioning, the common law has had no problem accommodating changing
social preferences, values, and ideals. We argue that it is entirely because of
its reliance on its conceptual architecture that the common law is able to
24 See, e.g., Robert S. Summers, The General Duty of Good Faith—Its Recognition and Conceptualization, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 810, 811 (1982) (arguing that “good faith” symbolizes a commitment to
justice and contractual morality); Michael P. Van Alstine, Of Textualism, Party Autonomy, and Good Faith,
40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1223, 1225 (1999) (suggesting that the “good faith” requirement implicates
“the role of the state in imposing minimal standards of honesty and fairness” in contractual dealings).
25 See, e.g., Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Anticipating Litigation in Contract Design, 115
YALE L.J. 814, 852-53 (2006) (describing the use of precise terms in loan agreements, such as
“promise to insure,” as proxies for good faith ex post).
26 See generally Alan D. Miller & Ronen Perry, The Reasonable Person, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 323
(2012) (arguing that reasonableness should be defined normatively, not positively or empirically).
27 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2011) (preventing corporate charters from
limiting the liability of directors for, among other things, violations of the common law duties of
loyalty and good faith).
28 See Richard A. Epstein, The Static Conception of the Common Law, 9 J. LEGAL S TUD. 253,
256-65 (1980) (illustrating this reality using different doctrines in the areas of tort, contract, and
property law).
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achieve such normative change while leaving its doctrinal content largely
intact. Change in the common law is thus in a sense chameleonic, insofar as it
comes about with minimal structural disruption. As we argue, common law
concepts contribute to this process of normative change in three possible ways.
In the first method, which we characterize as the process of interpretive
change, courts bring about change in the normative content of the common
law by altering the relative importance of the jural and normative meanings
of a legal concept. At any point in time, a legal concept embodies an
equilibrium between its normative meaning and its commonly understood
jural meaning. When a court seeks to change the normative meaning of a
concept, it shifts the emphasis of the concept away from the more specific
normative meaning and towards the more general jural meaning, which then
allows it to imbue the concept with new or different normative content. A
good example of such intraconceptual change is seen in the concept of
“unreasonable interference,” which has long been a part of private nuisance.29
In developing nuisance doctrine, courts initially used the idea merely to
examine the objective nature of the defendant’s interference, that is, whether
it was material.30 In due course, however, they began interpreting “unreasonable interference” as requiring a balancing of the plaintiff ’s harm against
the importance of the defendant’s activity. 31 Courts that achieved this
change did so by emphasizing the concept’s jural meaning—of requiring a
holistic balancing exercise—over its normative meaning, thereby altering
the salience of the jural meaning in order to imbue it with new content.
The second method of normative change is best described as interconceptual
change. Here, the common law working through its substantive doctrines
comes to emphasize one concept over others within a particular doctrine,
thereby enabling it to affirm the normative values and ideas that are associated
with that specific concept over others within the relevant doctrinal framework.
And over time, the concept that the common law doctrine emphasizes
evolves to determine the normative orientation of the doctrine as a whole.
This phenomenon is seen in the doctrine of “adverse possession” in property
law, which has long been known to consist of five conceptual elements:
hostility, continuity, openness, actual possession, and exclusivity. 32 At
29 Joel Franklin Brenner, Nuisance Law and the Industrial Revolution, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 403,
409 (1974).
30 See id. at 405 (“All [a plaintiff ] must show is that he has been injured by the defendant’s
conduct . . . .”).
31 See id. at 409 (describing how the courts began to evaluate reasonableness “by striking a
balance between [the plaintiff ’s] suffering and the general standard of amenity”).
32 See Dimmick v. Dimmick, 374 P.2d 824, 826 (Cal. 1962) (en banc) (analyzing the five conceptual elements); West v. Evans, 175 P.2d 219, 220 (Cal. 1946) (en banc) (same); Hacienda Ranch
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different times, the law has emphasized one of these elements over the
others, in effect altering the normative orientation of the doctrine. At one
point, the common law emphasized the element of hostility, using it as a
mechanism by which to scrutinize the motives of a party in an effort to
emphasize fairness.33 Over time, adverse possession in many jurisdictions
moved away from this concept and instead came to emphasize actual
possession, which can be seen as an effort to imbue the doctrine with an
emphasis on efficient resource use rather than subjective fairness.34 Thus, by
increasing (or decreasing) the relative weight of hostility and actual
possession in adverse possession, the common law oriented the doctrine
towards (or away from) fairness at different times. Another good example of
such salience alteration is to be found in the law of negligence, in the early
battle between the concepts of “duty of care” and “proximate cause.”35
Courts have used the terms in different contexts to modulate the scope of
liability in the pursuit of different normative goals.36
A third method of normative change in the common law that we describe
here is the process of additive change, which involves the common law adding
an altogether new concept into its repertoire, principally in order to introduce
a new normative dimension (or objective) to an existing area of law. This
method of change is fairly common. A familiar example is the inclusion of
the “implied warranty of habitability,” which concretized the goal of
Homes, Inc. v. Superior Court, 131 Cal. Rptr. 3d 498, 500 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (same); see also
Richard A. Epstein, Past and Future: The Temporal Dimension in the Law of Property, 64 WASH. U.
L.Q. 667, 680 (1986) (“With adverse possession the requirements that possession be actual, open,
notorious, continuous, hostile and under color of title are often read into statutes in order to flesh
out their basic structure.”).
33 See, e.g., R.H. Helmholz, Adverse Possession and Subjective Intent, 61 WASH. U. L.Q. 331,
336 (1983) (finding that in the majority of cases, judges have not hesitated to look into the
possessor’s state of mind and subjective intent); see also Walls v. Grohman, 337 S.E.2d 556, 562
(N.C. 1985) (overturning prior precedent that required a possessor to be a thief in order for the
possession to be adverse); Epstein, supra note 32, at 687-89 (considering whether good faith
possessors and bad faith possessors should be subject to different standards); Lee Anne Fennell,
Efficient Trespass: The Case for “Bad Faith” Adverse Possession, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 1037, 1039-40
(2006) (describing how courts overwhelmingly favor good faith possessors).
34 See Chaplin v. Sanders, 676 P.2d 431, 435-36 (Wash. 1984) (en banc); Fennell, supra note
33, at 1059-60 (arguing that the true purpose of adverse possession is to move land into the hands
of a “higher-valuing user”).
35 Compare Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99, 100-01 (N.Y. 1928) (finding that the injury
was not foreseeable, and therefore the defendant had no duty), with id. at 103-05 (Andrews, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the plaintiff’s injury was proximately caused by the defendant); see also
Patrick J. Kelley, Restating Duty, Breach, and Proximate Cause in Negligence Law: Descriptive Theory and
the Rule of Law, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1039, 1063 (2001) (“The proximate cause issue . . . focuses on the
purpose, not the application, of the relevant community norm.”).
36 See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 917,
950 (2010) (describing different suggested normative orientations for duty doctrine).
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consumer (i.e., tenant) welfare into the law of leases, an area of substantive
law that historically treated the parties’ interactions as an arm’s length
transaction.37 It has since become a staple of the common law of landlord–
tenant relations. An additional example of this phenomenon is the concept
of “quasi-property,” which the common law developed to connote a basis for
liability that flowed from an obligation analogous to property’s right to
exclude, but which would not attach to the physical boundaries of a
resource.38 We see this concept emerging in the context of burial rights39
and in the context of informational resources of fleeting economic value.40
In addition to giving the common law an element of jural determinacy
over time and normative determinacy on a contextual basis, legal concepts
thus operationalize the common law’s basic mechanism of change: one that
scholars have routinely characterized as “incrementalism”41 without explicating
the nuance through which this actually comes about in practice. Examining
the common law’s conceptual structure and the dual nature of meaning that
these concepts embody reveals in somewhat granular detail precisely how
common law incrementalism works in practice.
Our analysis and defense of the common law’s basic conceptual architecture in this Article yields three key contributions. Our first contribution is
theoretical. By introducing the distinction between jural meaning and
normative meaning, we bring into light the deep architecture of the common
law that holds the key to the system’s vitality and longevity. It is through this
unique combination that the common law has been able to provide legal
actors with a solid foundation on which to build their legal expectations,
37 See Javins v. First Nat’l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1072-73, 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (holding
that there is an implied warranty of habitability in leases of urban dwelling units). See generally
David A. Super, The Rise and Fall of the Implied Warranty of Habitability, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 389
(2011) (discussing the history and gradual weakening of the implied warranty of habitability
doctrine).
38 See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Quasi-Property: Like, But Not Quite Property, 160 U. PA. L.
REV. 1889, 1899-1900 (2012) [hereinafter Balganesh, Quasi-Property] (arguing that for quasiproperty interests, the entitlement derives from the nature, context, and consequence of the
parties’ interactions).
39 See, e.g., Fuller v. Marx, 724 F.2d 717, 719 (8th Cir. 1984) (holding that relatives of the
deceased have a quasi-property right to the body); Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Wilson, 51
S.E. 24, 26 (Ga. 1905); O’Donnell v. Slack, 55 P. 906, 907 (Cal. 1899); Burney v. Children’s Hosp.
in Bos., 47 N.E. 401, 402 (Mass. 1897).
40 See Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 236 (1918) (“Regarding the
news, . . . it must be regarded as quasi property, irrespective of the rights of either as against the
public.”).
41 See, e.g., FREDERICK SCHAUER, THINKING LIKE A LAWYER: A NEW INTRODUCTION TO
LEGAL REASONING 106 (2009); see also CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL
MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT 53 (1999); Richard A. Posner, Pragmatic Adjudication, 18
CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 5 (1996).
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while leaving the door open to normative infusions of meaning, which
produces a process of constant updating. As a result of the latter effect,
common law doctrine has managed to remain relevant even in the face of
radical changes in social preferences.
Second, and relatedly, we show that the unique design of the common law
system underwrites a constant competition in the marketplace for ideas. By
keeping the normative meaning open to competing value-based interpretations,
the common law metaphorically extends an open invitation to champions of
particular philosophies and ideologies to reshape the normative meaning of
common law concepts. In our vision, common law doctrines are never fully
dominated by one value at any given time, as theorists like Judge Richard
Posner and Professor Ernest Weinrib have suggested, 42 but rather always
embody a plurality of values even when it appears that a single value such as
efficiency or fairness predominates. As a descriptive matter, it is therefore our
view that the common law is impervious by its very structure to value monism.
Third, we posit, as a normative matter, that it would be highly undesirable—indeed, impractical—to endorse the calls of some legal theorists to
engage in free-floating policy analysis that is not pegged to concrete legal
concepts.43 In our view, legal concepts provide an essential framework for
policy analysis and debate. General calls of the type to “maximize economic
efficiency” or “do what is just” cannot on their own form a basis for the
operation of a legal system. They are too abstract and general to serve a useful
function. Legal concepts, by contrast, allow policymakers to take account of
value-based theories that inform the law and apply them in a contextualized
and nuanced fashion, such that they better fit our social preferences at any
given time.
The Article unfolds in three parts. Part I begins with a discussion of the
common law’s conceptual architecture. It unpacks the idea of legal “concepts”
and differentiates it from other analogous (but distinct) terms such as principles and doctrines. It also discusses the two types of meaning that legal
concepts in the common law can and do embody—jural and normative—and
provides an overview of how the two operate symbiotically. Part II builds on
the framework set out in Part I to argue that it is through the common law’s
architecture of concepts that it is able to maintain an operational equilibrium
between stability and change over time and across contexts. Part II explains
the precise mechanism by which the common law’s normative goals can
change over time, while the jural meaning remains static, and how this
42
43

LANDES & POSNER, supra note 5, at 24; WEINRIB, supra note 6, at 19.
See, e.g., Saul Levmore, Judging Deception, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1779, 1789-90 (2007) (suggesting
that cases with different factual elements be decided with a “more general theory”).
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interaction contributes to the “growth,” “evolution,” and flexibility of the
common law over time. Part III addresses the payoffs that flow from our
account of the common law’s architecture, especially in the face of a barrage
of criticism that has been leveled at the common law and legal concepts over
the last several decades. A short conclusion ensues.
I. LEGAL CONCEPTS AND THE DUALITY OF MEANING
Ever since the advent of Legal Realism as the dominant approach to
common law analysis in the United States, legal concepts and conceptual
analysis in the common law have come to be regarded with undue suspicion.
Perhaps the most dramatic criticism of such conceptual analysis was seen in
Felix Cohen’s account of the “heaven of legal concepts” that contained “all the
logical instruments needed to manipulate and transform these legal concepts
and thus to create and to solve the most beautiful of legal problems,” a process
that was in the end of little value since it was “freed from all entangling
alliances with human life.”44 The study of legal concepts and their role in legal
reasoning was, to Cohen, mere “transcendental nonsense.”45 While conceptual
analysis in the law has seen a resurgence in the years since, it has taken place
largely within the domain of the philosophical analysis of the concept of law
and only rarely ever beyond. 46 Theorization about the common law, in
particular, has tended to underemphasize the role of legal concepts.47
A large part of the reason why conceptual analysis tends to be disfavored
in the common law today is because it is commonly associated with a belief in
the autonomy of law and legal reasoning. In other words, admitting a role for
legal concepts is taken to be incompatible with a scrutiny of the common law’s
underlying normative goals. This need not be the case.48 Legal concepts can
coexist with a normative account of the common law. Indeed, they facilitate
44 Cohen, supra note 2, at 809. Cohen’s rhetoric was powerful enough that Hart too thought
it necessary to refer to it in his seminal book. See H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 130
(3d ed. 2012).
45 Cohen, supra note 2, at 821. For a comprehensive rejoinder to Cohen, discussed in more
detail below, see Jeremy Waldron, “Transcendental Nonsense” and System in the Law, 100 COLUM. L.
REV. 16 (2000).
46 See Charles Lowell Barzun, Legal Rights and the Limits of Conceptual Analysis: A Case Study,
26 RATIO JURIS 215, 215-16 (2013).
47 For exemplary work contrary to this trend, see Goldberg & Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, supra
note 36; Henry E. Smith, On the Economy of Concepts in Property, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 2097 (2012);
and Benjamin C. Zipursky, Pragmatic Conceptualism, 6 LEGAL THEORY 457 (2000).
48 Judge Cardozo’s judicial decisions and writings can be seen as an effort to refute the idea
that any reliance on legal concepts entails a belief in the autonomy of law (i.e., in mechanical
jurisprudence). For an excellent account, see John C.P. Goldberg, The Life of the Law, 51 STAN. L.
REV. 1419, 1455-74 (1999) (book review).
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such an account because they are capable of accommodating and affirming
multiple and different normative goals at different points in time. This Part
provides an overview of what legal concepts are and how their duality of
meaning renders them compatible with the normative analysis of the
common law.
A. Legal Concepts in the Common Law
Since legal concepts are often used to define ideas in the law, it is somewhat
artificial to attempt to define a legal concept. All the same, such a definition is
of practical utility insofar as it enables us to understand legal concepts as
distinct functional entities in the law. Legal concepts are ubiquitous in law
and legal analysis, despite the influence of Legal Realism. They often serve
to simplify complex social realities, thereby allowing the law to attach
specific consequences to such realities. In the common law, legal concepts
are thus best understood as the operational legal devices that the common law
uses in doctrine to understand and compartmentalize aspects of a legal issue or
dispute. This understanding of a legal concept embodies two important and
perhaps related dimensions: (1) it must be operational and (2) it must be
interpretive. Each of these deserves elucidation.
In insisting that a legal concept embody an operational dimension, the
understanding above limits legal concepts to those that are actively employed
in legal doctrine and analyses, when applied to the facts of a particular case. It
thereby excludes concepts that are purely academic or abstract and never
directly employed as part of a court’s legal reasoning when deciding a case. An
example of the latter would be the idea of “reciprocal” causation made famous
by Ronald Coase.49 Very importantly, this operational dimension also helps
distinguish between a legal concept and a legal doctrine. Legal doctrines in
the common law usually depend on individual constituent elements, each of
which in turn embodies one or more legal concepts that the doctrine uses to
interact with the facts in question. On rare occasion, a doctrine may itself
operate as a concept, in which case the operational dimension is satisfied. The
doctrine of “unclean hands” in equity provides a good example.50 It relies on
the concept of the exact same name for its working. Legal concepts, in our
understanding, must therefore have a practical orientation and interact
directly with facts in individual disputes.
49 R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & E CON. 1, 2 (1960). For a critique, see
Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Essay, What Happened to Property in Law and Economics?,
111 YALE L.J. 357, 391 (2001) (referring to Coase’s approach as one of “causal agnosticism”).
50 See generally Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Coming into Equity with Clean Hands, 47 MICH. L.
REV. 877 (1949).
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It is for the same reason that legal concepts generally remain distinct
from what Ronald Dworkin described as “principles.”51 Principles generally
operate as background jural statements that merely provide a reason for a
legal decisionmaker to decide one way or another, without necessitating a
particular decision, as would be the case with a legal rule.52 In other words, a
principle may be altogether disregarded by the decisionmaker, or come to be
outweighed by a rule. As a general matter, then, principles are usually of
indirect operational significance in doctrine, insofar as they are used to
shape the application of doctrine without directly interacting with the facts
of a case, rendering them distinct from legal concepts as defined here.53
When, however, a legal principle comes to be directly embedded into a legal
rule, such that it starts interacting directly with facts during the legal
analysis, the principle becomes a legal concept in our understanding.54
In addition, and perhaps somewhat more importantly, legal concepts are
usually interpretive in nature. The idea of interpretive concepts was also
made famous by Dworkin, who argued that the interpretive nature implies
that these concepts have more than just a descriptive element to them.55
They are instead understood by participants as serving some purpose or
interest that has an existence quite independent of the concept itself. This
interpretive nature also ensures that application of the concept to individual
circumstances involves a distinct element of sensitivity to that purpose or
value in question, such that the concept can be interpreted to be “modified
or qualified” by the relevant purpose.56 Legal concepts therefore do more
than just describe factual reality. The purposive and normative nature of
legal reasoning imbues them with an evaluative dimension—wherein they
(i.e., the concepts) are used to evaluate and understand reality, and at the
same time are themselves influenced by criteria and values that are seen as
51
52

See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 22-26 (1977).
A good example that Dworkin provides is the principle that “[n]o man may profit from his
own wrong.” Id. at 26.
53 For a useful rejoinder to Dworkin, suggesting that legal principles are not very distinct
from legal rules in practice as understood by positivism, see Joseph Raz, Legal Principles and the
Limits of Law, 81 YALE L.J. 823 (1972). This debate is orthogonal to our analytical claims here and
we therefore take no position on it.
54 Dworkin recognizes this possibility himself. D WORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY,
supra note 51, at 28. The use of “reasonableness” in the Sherman Act is a good example, where
unreasonableness at first played the role of a background principle in light of the terse wording of
the statute but, in due course, came to play a more direct role once courts developed the “rule of
reason” approach to antitrust analysis. As the name indicates, in the “rule of the reason,” the
question of unreasonableness becomes part of the rule and is directly applied in the analysis. Here,
we may legitimately say that it is a legal concept. See id. at 27-28.
55 See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 45-46 (1986).
56 Id. at 47.
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important to such reasoning. Or as Dworkin puts it, in such interpretive
concepts “[v]alue and content have become entangled.”57 This point, as we
shall see, is crucial to the role that such concepts play in facilitating normative
change in the common law.
Both of these conditions are characteristic of innumerable legal concepts
in the common law. Even a cursory examination of common law doctrine
will reveal that legal concepts, as captured in the definition above, dominate
the actual content of the common law in a variety of areas. “Good faith,”
“privity,” “duty of care,” “proximate cause,” “foreseeability,” “reasonableness,”
“commercial fairness,” “unreasonable risk,” “offensive,” “substantial harm,”
“wanton disregard,” “intentional,” and a host of others readily qualify.
B. The Duality of Meaning
Legal concepts are usually terms of ordinary linguistic usage. All the
same, as a result of their use within legal reasoning, such terms can come to
acquire an understanding that is different—in varying degrees—from their
ordinary linguistic one. Yet this specialized (i.e., legal) understanding itself
embodies two distinct dimensions. We describe these two dimensions as the
“jural meaning” and the “normative meaning” of legal concepts.
Scholars have previously noted the idea that legal concepts can have two
meanings. Some legal theorists refer to it as the distinction between the
“descriptive” and “prescriptive” meanings of legal terms, as the distinction
between the “definition[al]” content of legal concepts and their “justificatory
theory,” or as the difference between the legal concept as a mere “conceptual
marker” and the foundational theory in the service of which it is employed
in a particular context.58 What varies in these accounts is the precise source
of each type of meaning, the contingent–permanent nature of the meaning,
and the way in which the two meanings interact within legal reasoning. It is
in these important respects—and not just terminological—that our account
is distinct, since the common law’s conceptual architecture—as we argue—is
intrinsically designed to accommodate the process of incremental normative
change over time.

57
58

Id. at 48.
See generally Jules L. Coleman & Jody Kraus, Rethinking the Theory of Legal Rights, 95 YALE
L.J. 1335 (1986); Timothy P. Terrell, “Property,” “Due Process,” and the Distinction Between Definition
and Theory in Legal Analysis, 70 GEO. L.J. 861 (1981); Peter Westen, “Freedom” and “Coercion”—
Virtue Words and Vice Words, 1985 DUKE L.J. 541. We also see Zipursky implicitly adopting a
similar distinction, though not explicitly. See Zipursky, supra note 47, 474-78.
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1. Jural Meaning
The jural meaning of a legal concept refers to its core structural understanding, which derives from both (1) the concept’s semantic content and (2)
its use within the legal community (i.e., its pragmatic content). Our account
of the jural meaning does not take the semantic (or plain) meaning of the
concept to exhaust its entire jural domain. It also recognizes that the
concept’s use within a certain community builds on the semantic content to
give it a meaning that goes beyond its purely literal meaning—what is often
referred to as the pragmatic content of the concept.59 The two (i.e., the
semantic and pragmatic content of the concept) together give a concept its
jural meaning. It begins with the semantic meaning of the concept but then
situates that semantic meaning within the context of how the concept is
actually used—jurally—within the relevant legal community.60
Consider the concept of “proximate cause” in tort law.61 In its plain,
linguistic sense, the concept simply denotes a close-enough antecedent event
that can be causally attributed to a subsequent event.62 This constitutes the
semantic content of the term and might seem almost entirely factual or
descriptive. As used by the community of tort lawyers and courts, we see the
semantic content coming to be refined such that the purely factual dimension
is instead replaced with a distinctively evaluative one. When the semantic
content is now understood together with the context of its usage (i.e., the
pragmatic content), “proximate cause” now comes to mean the judgment that
a certain antecedent event should be deemed by the law as close enough to be
treated as legally responsible for the subsequent event based not just on fact
but on independent evaluative criteria as well.63 This represents the jural
meaning of the concept of proximate cause. Open-ended, abstract, and
amenable to the exercise of judicial discretion as it may be, the jural meaning
nonetheless gives the concept of proximate cause its basic structural content

59 For an account of the semantic–pragmatic distinction, see Scott Brewer, Exemplary Reasoning:
Semantics, Pragmatics, and the Rational Force of Legal Argument by Analogy, 109 HARV. L. REV. 923, 987
(1996).
60 See COLEMAN, supra note 15, at 7 (describing a similar process of using the inferential role
of a concept to analyze a term as “inferential role semantics”).
61 See generally Joseph H. Beale, The Proximate Consequences of an Act, 33 HARV. L. REV. 633
(1920); Charles E. Carpenter, Workable Rules for Determining Proximate Cause, 20 CALIF. L. REV.
229 (1932); Henry W. Edgerton, Legal Cause, 72 U. PA. L. REV. 211 (1924); James Angell
McLaughlin, Proximate Cause, 39 HARV. L. REV. 149 (1925).
62 See Beale, supra note 61, at 633.
63 See generally LEON GREEN, RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE (1927); Richard W.
Wright, Causation in Tort Law, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1735 (1985).
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as a legal concept that in turn enables it to be used as a part of the common
vocabulary of tort law.
Perhaps the best-known effort to discern the jural meaning of legal
concepts along the lines just described is seen in the work of Wesley
Hohfeld.64 Hohfeld is well known for having created an elaborate taxonomy
of jural relations in the law in an effort to render legal usage clear.65 In so
doing, however, Hohfeld’s approach was at once sensitive to both semantics
and to usage within the legal community, both of which he sought to
balance. While he of course did not seek to ground his analysis in a purely
empirical investigation of how terms were actually used within the legal
community, he at the same time allowed the jural content of the various
concepts under analysis to be influenced by this reality. Describing his
motivations and constraints in this regard, Hohfeld’s colleague Arthur
Corbin characterized his approach as follows:
Hohfeld effected this compromise at a convenient and serviceable point. He
followed “inveterate usage” closely enough to be understood by the average
lawyer. He accepted fundamental concepts “as used in judicial reasoning.” . . . All that was necessary was for him to see jural relations with their
eyes, and to identify the several fundamental varieties of factual situations and
to describe them in ordinary human words.66

In thus trying to discern the jural meaning and content of different legal
concepts as used in legal reasoning, Hohfeld’s approach was sensitive to
both ordinary semantic meaning and the specialized usages within the
relevant community. Very importantly, Hohfeld’s work was transsubstantive and looked to a host of different substantive areas for support.
Surely, as Hohfeld himself recognized, each of these areas remains wedded
to different goals and purposes. Yet what allowed his project to retain its
trans-substantive dimension was its recognition that the structural meaning
of a concept could be discerned independent of an area’s commitment to
specific goals. A “right” and a “duty” in this analysis meant something
specific, and indeed the same thing, regardless of whether one was using the
term in the context of contract law or constitutional law. It denoted an
affirmative claim that an individual or entity had, which placed another

64 See generally Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710 (1917); Hohfeld, supra note 11.
65 See generally Albert Kocourek, The Hohfeld System of Fundamental Legal Concepts, 15 U. ILL.
L. REV. 24 (1920).
66 Arthur L. Corbin, Jural Relations and Their Classification, 30 YALE L.J. 226, 235 (1921).
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person or entity under an obligation of a certain kind. This is indeed what
we mean by the jural meaning of a legal concept.
Hohfeld’s analytical work, its trans-substantive dimension, and its
endurance for a full century highlight a fairly important reality for our
analysis; namely, that almost all legal concepts in the common law do indeed
contain a discernible structural logic that undergirds their ability to remain
a part of the common vocabulary within the broader legal community. This
structural component may originate in the pure semantics of the concept, in
its structural relationship to other concepts within a given domain, and in the
way in which the relevant interpretive community comes to understand it.
An important caveat is in order here. Merely because the jural meaning
of a concept—as we describe it—can derive some of its content from the
way in which the concept is used by the relevant legal actors, we should not
be taken to suggest that such use alone, when taken from an external point
of view, can on its own constitute the concept’s jural meaning.67 In other
words, the allowance for usage to play a role in determining the jural
meaning does not imply that jural meaning now becomes a purely, or even
principally, empirical inquiry. While the inquiry may indeed look to what
the relevant legal actors see as the relevant legal concept, the inquiry is an
attempt to understand the meaning of the concept through their eyes (i.e.,
from a principally internal point of view). It therefore is not an effort to
understand how they modify their behavior in light of such concepts, or an
effort to predict the consequences that flow from the use of a legal concept.
To adopt the latter approach would in effect be to deny legal concepts their
own internal meaning, in the suggestion that such concepts are metaphysical
placeholders that are “meaningless” in their own right, an idea famously
advanced by the Scandinavian Realists.68
In looking to the relevant interpretive community to understand the jural
meaning of a concept, the examination is therefore of that community’s
understanding of the concept’s structural prerequisites. And to achieve this,
one must look to the semantic and linguistic content of the legal concept in
order to appreciate how the community’s understanding builds on, and
interfaces with, that understanding. Indeed, this is precisely what we
understand Hohfeld to have been attempting to do as well, in looking into
how courts and judges understood and applied the various jural relations
that he identified. The precise balance between semantic content and actual
usage will of course vary from one context to another, but the task of

67
68

For a similar point, see H. L. A. Hart, Scandinavian Realism, 1959 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 233, 237-38.
Id. at 235.
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discerning a concept’s jural meaning must not lose sight of the fact that both
remain equally relevant to the exercise.
Consider the example of “originality” in the federal common law of
copyright.69 As understood by copyright lawyers and courts today, and in
the wake of recent jurisprudence in the United States, originality is equated
with “creativity” and understood to require that a work of authorship
exhibit a modicum of creativity for it to qualify for copyright protection.70
If one were to simply look to what judges say about originality in cases, one
might be tempted to treat originality and creativity as synonyms, and
nothing more. Yet this would miss an important jural reality behind the
meaning of originality; namely, that it is not sufficient if the work in
question is objectively creative, but that such creativity must originate (i.e.,
have its origins) in the creator seeking protection. 71 Courts rarely ever
address this question given how basic it is; and most take it as embedded
within the semantic meaning of originality as requiring the origination of
the creative content by the claimant. It is only when one recognizes that
there is indeed an internal logic to such concepts and that usage can help
glean that logic rather than replace it altogether, that looking to usage can
be helpful. In the example of originality, the usage by the community builds
on the semantic content and adds the objective requirement of creative
evaluation onto the semantic one of origination. Both work together to
produce the jural meaning.
Most concepts in the common law thus have a jural meaning that is
discernible through the semantic meaning of the concept and its common
usage within the interpretive community, when viewed from an internal
point of view. In addition, since it is oftentimes impossible to distinguish
between decision rules and conduct rules in the common law,72 many of the
common law’s legal concepts also embody a distinctive evaluative dimension
and come to partake of what Bernard Williams famously described as “thick
concepts.”73 Thick concepts, as philosophers have since come to understand
the term, refer to evaluative concepts where the evaluative content comes

69 See generally Howard B. Abrams, Originality and Creativity in Copyright Law, 55 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 3 (1992) (highlighting the serious repercussions attached to copyright law’s
definition of originality).
70 See id. at 14.
71 Id. at 14-15 (describing this as the “independent effort” or “independently originated”
standards).
72 See generally Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in
Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625 (1984) (describing conduct rules as rules designed to guide
behavior and decision rules as rules directed to officials applying the law).
73 BERNARD WILLIAMS, ETHICS AND THE LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHY 140-44 (1985).
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with an identifiable descriptive content that influences and directs such
evaluation.74 A common example is the distinction between the concepts of
“good” and “beautiful.” Both involve an evaluation; yet the former (good) is
open-ended and specifies no descriptive criteria for the evaluation, whereas
the latter (beautiful) conveys additional descriptive content—that of
requiring the evaluation to focus on aesthetically pleasing dimensions—in
carrying out the evaluation. Thick concepts contain implicit semantic
direction to the evaluator about the appropriate criteria that may be used
whereas thin concepts leave this open-ended. Once again, we see how the
semantic content of the concept itself contributes to the jural meaning of the
concept. As a normative enterprise, the law contains innumerable thick
concepts. Examples are legion: “good faith,” “reasonableness,” “best interests,”
“business judgment,” “fair use,” etc. The precise descriptive content is of
course different for each of these concepts, which is why thickness is
understood as a continuum rather than as a binary.75 All the same, these
concepts require actors to carry out their evaluations using different criteria.
One may of course complain that such criteria are too open-ended, or that
they give judges too much discretion and so on, but one cannot accuse the
concepts of lacking meaning and analytical content.
It is this underlying structural logic to legal concepts—which we term as
the concept’s jural meaning—that contributes to what Jeremy Waldron has
previously described as the “systematicity” of the law.76 In his rejoinder to
Felix Cohen, Waldron argues that legal concepts play a crucial role in
enabling the legal system and decisionmakers therein to see its various rules
as necessarily interrelated. As he puts it:
[T]he technical language of the law . . . must be able to express the actual
interrelationships of legal provisions, laid down by diverse and competing
lawmakers. The conceptual terminology of legal doctrine must be able to
accommodate policy initiatives inspired by different moralities, ideologies, and
programs, while resisting theoretical identification with any one of them. It
must be understood as a sort of neutral matrix on which their interlocking

74 See generally Simon Kirchin, Introduction: Thick and Thin Concepts (providing an example
using the terms “good” and “honest” to describe the different degrees of thickness), in THICK
CONCEPTS 1 (Simon Kirchin ed., 2013).
75 See Samuel Scheffler, Morality Through Thick and Thin: A Critical Notice of Ethics and the
Limits of Philosophy, 96 PHIL. REV. 411, 417-19 (1987) (book review) (reasoning that because our
“ethical vocabulary is very rich and diverse,” simply designating terms as thick or thin is an
oversimplification).
76 Waldron, supra note 45, at 19 & n.14.
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relations can be laid out without any assumption that the various elements
were, so to speak, made for one another.77

It is the jural meaning of the concept that in our view contributes to this
ideal of systematicity, by forming the elements that go into the construction
of the “neutral matrix” of interlocking ideals and propositions in the law.
In short, the jural meaning of a legal concept refers to the structural core
that gives the concept its logical basis as a term of usage. It originates in the
semantic content of the concept, which may include both structural and
descriptive criteria that are relevant and often interfaces with usage within
the community that sharpens or modifies the semantic content in question.
2. Normative Meaning
While the jural meaning of legal concepts gives them a common structural
understanding within the relevant interpretive community and contributes to
the overall systematicity of the legal system, the jural meaning on its own is
oftentimes insufficient to apply the concept to individual scenarios and arrive
at distinct conclusions. For instance, knowing the jural meaning of “proximate
cause” as a device for evaluating the causal connection between two events for
the purposes of legal responsibility does not on its own tell a court whether
a particular defendant’s actions should—in a particular case—be treated as
the proximate cause of the plaintiff ’s injuries, for example, whether the
railroad company’s actions should be treated as a proximate cause of Mrs.
Palsgraf ’s injuries.78
Legal concepts, despite being endowed with jural meaning, exhibit a
characteristic that has been variously described as the phenomenon of “open
texture,”79 “pervasive vagueness,”80 or “furry edges.”81 Applying them to any
particular context requires the decisionmaker or interpreter to rely on
additional factors beyond the domain of the standard jural meaning, since
the jural content of the concept has in effect run out.82 This reliance on

77
78

Id. at 47.
See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 352 (1928) (Andrews, J., dissenting)
(“What we do mean by the word ‘proximate’ is that, because of convenience, of public policy, of a
rough sense of justice, the law arbitrarily declines to trace a series of events beyond a certain point.
This is not logic. It is practical politics.”).
79 See Hart, supra note 44, at 124.
80 Frederick Schauer, A Critical Guide to Vehicles in the Park, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1109, 1124 (2008).
81 DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 51, at 22 (using the term “furry
edges” to describe Hart’s theory).
82 See BRIAN BIX, LAW, LANGUAGE, AND LEGAL DETERMINACY 18 (1993) (describing
the “need for judges in some cases to make ‘a fresh choice between open alternatives’”); Schauer,
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additional factors is discretionary on the part of the interpreter but is of
course to a large extent constrained by the jural meaning of the concept
itself. Yet it works in tandem with the jural meaning to now generate
meaning for the term that allows it to be applied to a given context. The
choice of additional factors is an indelibly normative one, and the meaning
that is so produced constitutes the normative meaning of the concept. In
our example before, if the decisionmaker were to decide that the question of
whether to find a cause to be close enough for legal responsibility ought to
track his or her understanding of morality (in ascribing responsibility), the
jural understanding of proximate cause now combines with this additional,
non-structural (i.e., moral) understanding to generate the normative
meaning of the concept: as representing sufficient closeness between the
events such that it is morally acceptable to consider one as the cause of the
other for the purposes of legal responsibility.83
The normative meaning of a legal concept thus involves the superimposition of a normative consideration on the jural meaning of the concept
when applying it to a particular context or dispute. A few things therefore
flow from this. First, the normative meaning of a legal concept is oftentimes
a highly contested issue among courts, scholars, and lawyers. Since the
additional variable chosen is not dictated by the concept itself, actors
invariably tend to choose different normative values based on their own
preferences. This contestation, however, is also the site and basis of legal
change in the common law, as we show in Part II below. Second, the jural
meaning of the concept is itself constitutive of the normative meaning, such
that the normative meaning has no existence independent of the former.
Part of what the normative meaning of a legal concept is depends on its
taking the jural meaning and infusing it with non-structural normative
considerations. Understanding this overlay is important because disagreement
over the normative meaning tends to be couched as disagreement over the
very jural meaning of the legal concept. Relatedly, such disagreement over
normative meaning is also used by some to suggest that the concept is
altogether meaningless, since there remains no common understanding
about the concept itself.84 It is only when the superimposition of the two is
appreciated that such claims can be seen to be exaggerated.

supra note 80, at 1125 (explaining how, with vague laws and multiple applications, judges are
required to sometimes exercise discretion and apply extralegal factors to reach a decision).
83 See Stephen R. Perry, The Moral Foundations of Tort Law, 77 IOWA L. REV. 449, 505-06
(1992) (linking proximate cause to outcome responsibility).
84 Cf. Hart, supra note 67, at 235.

2015]

Structure and Value in the Common Law

1263

As Dworkin noted, actors engaged in legal reasoning invariably approach
concepts with an interpretive attitude—characterized by the recognition of a
purpose underlying a concept and the ability of that purpose to qualify or
modify the meaning of that concept.85 It is indeed this interpretive attitude
that generates the normative meaning of legal concepts. As a result of the
recognition that concepts in the law serve important purposes—defined by
distinctively normative considerations—the very process of interpreting a
concept involves infusing it with those pre-identified purposes, a process that
while generally couched in positive language (e.g., concept x means y) in
reality involves a normative judgment (i.e., concept x should mean y). The
process of elucidating the normative meaning of a concept is therefore a
distinctively “justificatory” exercise, even if it is framed as a purely “explanatory” one.86
In characterizing this second meaning of legal concepts as “normative,” we
should not be understood as claiming that the jural meaning of the concept is
in some ways purely descriptive, or as embodying a truth-value that renders it
altogether value neutral.87 We thus are in no way attempting to resurrect the
analytic–synthetic and fact–value distinctions that philosophers have famously
come to reject. 88 Indeed, some have criticized efforts to derive separate
meanings for legal concepts as requiring just such a distinction and, in
addition, a purely positivist approach to law, that is, the belief that legal rules
and ideas are altogether immune from morality and other similar considerations.89 Our claim here is quite different.
The distinction between the jural and normative meanings that we draw
here would work perfectly well as long as one takes the difference between
structural and substantive concerns underlying the concept to be our central
concern. Whereas the jural meaning is a reference to structural concerns,
the normative meaning relates to substantive concerns. It is very well

85 See DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 55, at 47 (describing how the interpretive
attitude has two components, the first being an assumption about value, and the second that the
rules and concepts are “sensitive to [the] point”).
86 See COLEMAN, supra note 15, at 9.
87 But see Westen, supra note 58, at 544 (arguing that some concepts, such as “federal,” are
descriptive and neutral).
88 For accounts of these distinctions, see HILARY PUTNAM, THE COLLAPSE OF THE
FACT/VALUE DICHOTOMY AND OTHER ESSAYS (2004); Ruth Anna Putnam, Creating Facts
and Values, 60 PHIL. 187 (1985); W. V. Quine, Two Dogmas of Empiricism, 60 PHIL. REV. 20 (1951);
Richard Swinburne, Analytic/Synthetic, 21 AM. PHIL. Q. 31 (1984); Friedrich Waismann, Analytic–
Synthetic, 10 ANALYSIS 25 (1949).
89 See, e.g., Barzun, supra note 46, at 216 (explaining and critiquing how some theorists argue
legal rights can be derived from purely conceptual claims and do not require any normative
arguments).
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possible that these structural concerns themselves derive from predispositions
as to certain values within the relevant legal community. Going back to the
example of proximate cause in tort law, it might well be argued (as some have)
that the very idea underlying the proximate cause concept and requirement
exhibits a judgment that there is an outer bound to the causal chain that the
law will recognize in order to impose liability. Even so, this judgment call is
very different from the additional judgment call of whether, accepting the
need for such an outer bound, we then ought to draw that boundary based on
considerations of morality, as opposed to, say, pure efficiency. It is this
intuition that our distinction between the jural and normative meanings of
legal concepts hopes to capture.
The distinction above is perhaps best captured in the distinction
between epistemic values and moral values that Brian Leiter has made, in
defense of what he calls “descriptive jurisprudence.”90 The epistemic value
refers to “truth-conducive desiderata we aspire to in theory construction,”
whereas the moral value relates directly to “practical reasonableness.”91 The
former focuses on the significance and importance of the phenomenon in
question being captured by the concept, while the latter directly engages the
“ought” question.92
This distinction leads us to another important insight about the normative
meaning of a legal concept. Since it derives from the open-textured nature of
the concept, and such open texture becomes obvious primarily when the
concept is sought to be applied to a given situation, the normative meaning of
a concept is generally formulated during the concept’s direct application to a
scenario. It is therefore rare to see the concept of proximate cause being
understood in moral and ethical terms while in the abstract; though it is
routinely associated with values of morality or efficiency when applied to
individual cases or circumstances. The normative meaning of a concept is
thus principally application-driven. Constitutional law scholars have captured
a largely analogous idea in the distinction between the “interpretation” and
“construction” of texts or rules. 93 The former focuses on linguistic and
semantic meaning, while the latter is concerned principally with the legal

90 Brian Leiter, Beyond the Hart/Dworkin Debate: The Methodology Problem in Jurisprudence, 48
AM. J. J URIS. 17, 30-43 (2003).
91 Id. at 34-35.
92 See id. at 35 (“Moral values are those values that bear on the questions of practical reasonableness, e.g., questions about how one ought to live . . . .”).
93 See Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation–Construction Distinction, 27 CONST. COMMENT.
95, 100-08 (2010) (highlighting the distinction between construction and interpretation and arguing
that it is important for legal scholars to understand this “real and fundamental” distinction).
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effect of the text when applied, which is an entirely normative exercise and
looks to considerations external to the text itself.94
An important caveat is in order here. In characterizing the “normative”
factors that go into generating a legal concept’s normative meaning from its
jural meaning, we remain indifferent to the question of whether these factors
constitute “legal” or “extra-legal” factors. In Hart’s positivist account, these
factors, which he saw as central to the exercise of judicial discretion, were
extra-legal, in transcending the traditional domains of legal reasoning.95 To
Dworkin on the other hand, these normative considerations were emblematic
of “principles” that courts use as part of legal rules thereby rendering them
legitimate sources of law.96 Our account here remains perfectly compatible
with either view, since nothing in our identification of a concept’s normative
meaning turns on its characterization as legal or extra-legal.
In summary then, the normative meaning of a legal concept refers to the
meaning that the structural idea behind the concept comes to acquire when
sought to be applied to individual scenarios, necessitating a decisionmaker’s
reliance on values and considerations external to the concept itself. In so
doing, the decisionmaker is making a direct normative judgment about what
values ought to be driving that concept, when applying it as part of common
law doctrine.
*

*

*

The duality of meaning that we defend here might be contrasted with
accounts which argue that legal concepts contain a single meaning at any
given point in time. In recent work, Jody Kraus offers a single meaning
account of concepts in the common law and suggests that this single
meaning can undergo a radical transformation over time, in order to
accommodate competing normative values.97 An account of legal concepts
that is wedded to the idea of a singularity—as opposed to duality—in their
meaning, is then compelled to identify “the” meaning of a concept, as used
and applied by courts across a substantive area.98 Failing this identification,
a singularity-based account risks the argument that the inability to identify
94
95

Id. at 96.
See HART, supra note 44, at 127; see also BIX, supra note 82, at 25-28; DWORKIN, TAKING
RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 51, at 17.
96 DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 51, at 28-39.
97 Jody S. Kraus, Transparency and Determinacy in Common Law Adjudication: A Philosophical
Defense of Explanatory Economic Analysis, 93 VA. L. REV. 287, 303, 326 (2007) (describing this
process as “radical semantic evolution”).
98 Id. at 331-36.

1266

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 163: 1241

a consistently accepted meaning suggests that a concept is in the end
altogether meaningless. The “duality of meaning” account, by contrast,
provides a coherent explanation for the seeming “inconsistencies” in courts’
usage of the term.
II. STABILITY AND CHANGE IN THE COMMON LAW
In Part I, we examined how concepts work in the common law and the
difference between the jural and normative meanings that legal concepts
embody. In this Part, we proceed to show how the interaction between the
two is responsible for maintaining an adequate level of stability necessary
for the successful operation of the common law, while at the same time
allowing for change at the normative level.
A. The Static–Dynamic Equilibrium in the Common Law
One of the core functions of the law is to guide behavior.99 For this reason,
the law must remain relatively stable, so that law-abiding citizens can plan
their actions in accordance with the law and develop reasonable expectations
about the legitimacy of their decisions.100 This logic is central to the idea of
the rule of law and is often captured by the simplistic observation that “the
rule of law lies in a law of rules.”101 An ever-changing legal system would
impose an impossible cost on its subjects, forcing them to constantly
re-educate themselves about the content of the law or live in fear of breaking
it. And if laws were routinely broken and violated, even without actual
enforcement, the overall legitimacy and credibility of the legal system would
as a direct result come to be undermined.102 Therefore, lawmakers cannot
change the law haphazardly.
At the same time, no one seriously argues that the legal system should
remain frozen in time—especially insofar as the system’s values and ideals
go. The law must reflect the normative values of the people who enacted it
and as they change over time; the law must adapt to ensure a good fit
between its normative underpinnings and the content of its rules. In fact,
99 See JOSEPH RAZ, THE A UTHORITY OF L AW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY 218
(2d ed. 2009) (“[T]he law should be capable of providing effective guidance.”).
100 Id. at 214-15 (“Stability is essential if people are to be guided by law in their long-term
decisions.”).
101 The idea was coined by Justice Antonin Scalia, see Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a
Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989), and is often associated with him, see HANOCH
DAGAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM & RETHINKING PRIVATE LAW
THEORY 203 (2013).
102 See DAGAN, supra note 101, at 203.
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when the law falls behind the times, it fails to serve the society that adopted
it, thereby undermining its own legitimacy.
Striking the right balance between the demands of stability and change is
therefore a challenge that every legal system must overcome. Jurists have long
identified this challenge and have argued that the best way to reconcile the
conflicting demands of stability and change is through a mechanism of
incremental or accretive evolution, often characterized as “incrementalism”103
or “minimalism.”104 In their descriptive accounts of the common law, Atiyah,105
Cardozo106 and Holmes107 masterfully explain how common law doctrine has
evolved over centuries through incremental doctrinal changes. By avoiding
abrupt and sweeping reform (unless absolutely crucial), common law judges
were able to secure continuity in the law without unduly disrupting actors’
expectations. This task was facilitated by their reliance on the “declaratory
theory” of the common law, according to which incremental (judicial) changes
in the common law were seen as merely restating the “correct” version of the
common law that had always been so, rather than as actively altering the law to
create altogether new rules.108 While almost everyone understood that judges
were in effect creating new rules, the declaratory theory provided the process
of incremental change with a rhetorical alibi that legitimized the process. At
the heart of this theory lies the idea that the law comes to be modified through
a process of small and gradual changes.
More recently, Professor Cass Sunstein has elevated incrementalism (or
“minimalism,” as he calls it) to the level of a normative theory, advocating that
all important legal changes, not only those of traditional common law areas,
should be effected gradually.109 In addition to unfairly disrupting expectations,
Sunstein argues that minimalism, which he associates with the political
theorist Edmund Burke, is premised on the idea that “established traditions are
generally just, adaptive to social needs, or at least acceptable.”110 Burke who

103 See, e.g., Frank B. Cross, Identifying the Virtues of the Common Law, 15 SUP. CT. ECON.
REV. 21, 58 (2007) (noting how the incrementalism of the common law appears to contribute to
“legal predictability”).
104 See Cass R. Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, 105 MICH. L. REV. 353, 356 (2006) (“Burkean
minimalists believe that constitutional principles must be built incrementally and by analogy, with
close reference to long-standing practices.”).
105 See generally P.S. ATIYAH, PRAGMATISM AND THEORY IN ENGLISH LAW (1987).
106 See generally BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW (1924);
CARDOZO, supra note 9.
107 See generally HOLMES, supra note 9; Holmes, supra note 10.
108 For an excellent recent account of the declaratory theory, see Allan Beever, The Declaratory
Theory of Law, 33 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 421 (2013).
109 SUNSTEIN , supra note 41, at 5.
110 Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, supra note 104, at 353.
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considered the common law “the pride of the human intellect,”111 lauded the
common law for closely tracking actual practices.
While these accounts of incrementalism in the common law are both
accurate and persuasive, they miss an important insight about incrementalism
itself. In focusing on the gradual nature of the change at the doctrinal level,
these accounts of incrementalism ignore the intrinsically adaptive role that
the actual content of the static doctrine plays, which in turn enables
common law doctrine to remain by and large unchanging while, at the same
time, responsive to shifting social values and preferences. In other words,
although common law doctrine may itself change infrequently and only over
extended periods of time, it is able to nonetheless remain relevant as a social
institution because its underlying devices (i.e., its legal concepts) are
capable of accommodating and advancing the “felt necessities of the
time.” 112 The common law’s conceptual framework thus forms the very
backbone of its commitment to incrementalism as a process of growth. Yet
extant accounts of common law incrementalism tend to ignore this reality,
which contributes to the characterization of the common law as an institution
that is traditional, conservative, and archaic in multiple respects, which is
indeed far from being true in practice. It is this omission in discussions of
incrementalism that our account addresses. Our claim is that the common
law’s ability to adapt to changes without unduly disrupting actors’ expectations
is embedded in the unique design and role of common law concepts.
As an example, consider a recent account of common law incrementalism
offered by Justice Breyer of the U.S. Supreme Court in a dissenting opinion
involving the overruling of a common law precedent.113 In describing the
process, he notes that “[c]ommon-law courts rarely overruled wellestablished earlier rules outright. Rather, they would over time issue
decisions that gradually eroded the scope and effect of the rule in question,
which might eventually lead the courts to put the rule to rest.”114 Clearly
unhappy with the majority opinion in the case, he goes on to note that
“[t]he reader should compare today’s ‘common-law’ decision with Justice
Cardozo’s decision in Allegheny College . . . and note a gradualism that does
not characterize today’s decision.”115 These observations about the common
law’s process of gradual change emphasize the restraint that common law
111 Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, in THE PORTABLE EDMUND
BURKE 416, 456 (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1999).
112 HOLMES, supra note 9, at 1.
113 See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 928 (2007) (Breyer,
J., dissenting).
114 Id.
115 Id. (citation omitted).
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courts are believed to exhibit, even when they see pre-existing law as worthy
of being changed. What this account altogether ignores, though, is the allimportant role that legal concepts played in enabling this—especially in the
very decision that Justice Breyer extolls as the archetype of common law
incrementalism!
Allegheny College v. National Chautauqua County Bank 116 has long been
understood as a case involving the doctrine of promissory estoppel and its
relationship to the requirement of consideration in contract law.117 In the short
opinion, then-Chief Judge Cardozo is taken to have successfully allowed a
claim of promissory estoppel by the plaintiff notwithstanding the existing
understanding of consideration.118 While the opinion may be a perfect example
of common law incrementalism, Cardozo succeeds in adopting an incremental
strategy by working closely with the legal concept of consideration. As one
scholar aptly puts it, in Cardozo’s hands, consideration “is a more open and
flexible concept than is usually appreciated.”119 The opinion showcases the role
that legal concepts play in underwriting the process of incremental doctrinal
change, with some even using it to characterize Cardozo as a “pragmatic
conceptualist.”120 In the opinion itself, Cardozo offers an interesting account of
legal concepts in the common law,121 which scholars have in the years since
spent significant time interpreting. He thus notes:
Decisions which have stood so long, and which are supported by so many
considerations of public policy and reason, will not be overruled to save the
symmetry of a concept which itself came into our law, not so much from
any reasoned conviction of its justice, as from historical accidents of practice
and procedure. The concept survives as one of the distinctive features of
our legal system. We have no thought to suggest that it is obsolete or on the
way to be abandoned. As in the case of other concepts, however, the pressure of exceptions has led to irregularities of form.122

In this somewhat obscure language, Cardozo is in effect extolling the
malleability of legal concepts in the common law—which enables them to
116
117

159 N.E. 173 (N.Y. 1927).
See Curtis Bridgeman, Allegheny College Revisited: Cardozo, Consideration, and Formalism
in Context, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 149, 150 (2005).
118 See id.
119 Alfred S. Konefsky, How to Read, or at Least Not Misread, Cardozo in the Allegheny College
Case, 36 BUFF. L. REV. 645, 670 (1987).
120 Bridgeman, supra note 117, at 183 n.170. The original characterization of Cardozo’s jurisprudence as a whole derives from Goldberg, The Life of the Law, supra note 48, at 1462 (“Cardozo
was a ‘pragmatic conceptualist.’”).
121 See Allegheny Coll. v. Nat’l Chautauqua Cnty. Bank, 159 N.E. 173, 175 (N.Y. 1927).
122 Id. at 175 (citation omitted).
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take new meaning and content—while remaining “distinctive” within the
doctrinal apparatus of the law.123 The incrementalism of the common law
then, even to Cardozo, was a direct result of the law’s conceptual structure
that in turn allowed for the common law as a whole to balance stability and
change. To Cardozo, common law concepts were forged and refined by the
contextual needs of individual cases (i.e., what we refer to as “values”), and
yet—perhaps most importantly—they were not to be treated as altogether
dispensable elements of the law.124
As noted previously, common law concepts have a core jural meaning that
remains constant through time and a normative meaning that is adaptable.125
It is through the interaction between these two meanings, both embodied in
legal concepts that the common law’s process of incremental change is
enabled. The jural meaning of legal concepts gives the common law its
requisite stability. Whenever the common law is used by courts and litigants, it
invariably relies on doctrines to resolve individual disputes. These doctrines, in
turn, employ legal concepts. Consequently, when actors go about their daily
affairs, they rely on those concepts as guideposts. For example, professionals
know that they must act reasonably. Similarly, in a contractual setting, parties
understand that they must negotiate in good faith. The same is true when a
dispute arises. In the standard common law case, the litigants agree on the
particular doctrine that applies to their dispute and the key concepts that
inform it. What they tend to disagree about, then, is the question of how that
doctrine applies to the agreed upon facts and circumstances of the case, or
how to construe the relevant concepts.
The jural meaning of concepts, in our account, stabilizes the common
law edifice, providing an important focal point for actors, judges, and even
scholars. The jural meaning can be thought of as the anchor of the common
law, the component that operationalizes stare decisis.126 Without this anchor,
courts would be unable to find common ground in prior decisions in order
to treat them as binding and applicable. It is thus concepts, by virtue of
their jural meaning, that provide a common denominator that ensures
continuity in the common law.
123
124

See Konefsky, supra note 119, at 647.
For an excellent account of Cardozo’s approach to legal analysis and his extensive reliance
on legal concepts, see Goldberg, The Life of the Law, supra note 48, at 1452 (arguing that, to
Cardozo, the job of the judge “was to understand, articulate, and apply—rather than to deconstruct or hide behind—the concepts embedded in law.”).
125 See supra Part I.
126 See William O. Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 735, 735-36 (1949) (“Stare
decisis provides some moorings so that men may trade and arrange their affairs with confidence.
Stare decisis serves to take the capricious element out of law and to give stability to a society.”).
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Take, for example, the concept of “good faith” in the common law of
contracts. 127 Under the common law of most jurisdictions, contracting
parties are under an obligation to negotiate and perform contracts in good
faith. This rule is taken to be a fairly well-established and immutable one
that has persisted for at least two centuries now.128 And yet the law speaks
of the content of this obligation in largely open-ended terms. The Uniform
Commercial Code, for instance, which largely codifies the common law
standard,129 defines good faith as “honesty in fact and the observance of
reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing.”130 While the particular list
of behaviors that violate the obligation of good faith have no doubt changed
over time and with context—for example, the obligation in relation to banks
is different from that in relation to merchants—the core jural meaning of
the concept has remained the same. 131 Courts, judges, legislatures, and
practitioners all have a shared understanding or common knowledge of the
concept and the obligation that it connotes as a structural matter, even if
not in its application to an individual case.
The idea described here is also captured in the distinction that some legal
philosophers make between the notions of indeterminacy and contestability in
the language of the law.132 While legal indeterminacy can originate in a
variety of reasons, in many situations legal terms (i.e., concepts) are often
“contestable” rather than ambiguous or vague. In these situations, as Jeremy
Waldron explains, it is not that the terms in question lack meaning or that the
determinacy of their meaning is compromised.133 Instead, as he clarifies, “it is
part of the meaning of these words to indicate that a value judgment is
required, a function which the words perform quite precisely.” 134 This
captures rather well our point about the jural meaning of legal concepts.
The jural meaning grounds legal actors’ common understanding of a
concept; and yet the concept preserves significant room for the actor’s own
127 For a good overview of good faith in contract law, see Summers, supra note 24; Robert S.
Summers, “Good Faith” in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of the Uniform Commercial
Code, 54 VA. L. REV. 195 (1968).
128 For an overview of the origins of good faith, see Alan D. Miller & Ronen Perry, Good
Faith Performance, 98 IOWA L. REV. 689, 690-94 (2013).
129 See, e.g., Kirke La Shelle Co. v. Paul Armstrong Co., 188 N.E. 163, 167 (N.Y. 1933) (“[I]n
every contract there exists an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.”).
130 U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(20) (2012).
131 See JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-4, at 11
(6th ed. 2010).
132 See Jeremy Waldron, Vagueness in Law and Language: Some Philosophical Issues, 82 CALIF.
L. REV. 509, 512-14 (1994) (distinguishing between “vague,” “ambiguous,” and “contestable”
expressions).
133 See id. at 527.
134 Id.
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value judgment, embodied in the normative meaning that the concept
carries. From the fact that the normative meaning of a concept can change
over time and context, and that it can generate disagreement among actors,
one cannot (indeed, should not) draw the inference that the concept lacks all
meaning. Indeed, Waldron makes the point somewhat sharper when he
further notes that in eliciting some kind of value judgment from actors,
such concepts embody a “clear meaning.”135
The open nature of legal concepts therefore does not imply that such
concepts lack meaning, or indeed that such meaning can originate in and
perhaps define a shared understanding among actors. The reason for this is
rather straightforward: it is because linguistic vagueness, which derives from
natural language, need not correspond to jural certainty or uncertainty in legal
usage.136 In other words, a term that is otherwise palpably unclear (or even
meaningless) can obtain jural content within a particular discourse (such as
legal discourse), if actors converge around a common understanding over
time. Indeed, this is the entire idea behind so-called “terms of art” or “legal
fictions.” It informs how the jural meaning of concepts ensures a modicum of
stability and operates as an anchor.
Another way of understanding the working of a concept’s jural meaning is
therefore as a form of shared understanding among actors. Recall that a vast
majority of legal concepts are evaluative, in the sense that they require actors
to make value judgments when applying the concept to specific contexts and
disputes.137 In so requiring actors to make value judgments, the jural meaning
of the concept does not, however, give its interpreter complete carte blanche.
Instead, it grounds and directs that value judgment in a particular direction. It
takes certain kinds of normative considerations off the table and renders certain
other ones more relevant and salient to the judgment itself. We noted previously that this is precisely how “thick” concepts work. Drawing on the
linguistic philosopher R.M. Hare, Waldron characterizes this idea as the strict
or specific “evaluative meaning” that the concept carries.138 Each legal concept,
in other words, despite its normative open-endedness when applied to specific
situations, signals to judges and actors that the disagreement (if any) in
application is to be limited to certain specific criteria. The identification of
such criteria enables the jural meaning of the legal concept to feed into a
community’s shared understandings and linguistic conventions, despite the
135
136

Id.
See id. at 537 (“[W]e must not make the mistake of assuming that the vagueness of natural
language predicates matches our pragmatic uncertainty about what should be done in future or
unanticipated cases.”).
137 See supra text accompanying notes 74-75.
138 Waldron, supra note 132, at 528-29.
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overall ethical and evaluative nature of the legal concept. A concept’s thickness,
in other words, contributes directly to the stability of the concept’s meaning,
even in the face of differential application.
Indeed, a careful perusal of common law cases reveals that judges have a
shared understanding of the jural meaning of the common law concepts. The
core jural meaning of the concept of good faith in contracts is understood or
defined in the same way by all judges. It requires judges to evaluate the
contracting parties’ behavior and motives contextually, using certain normative
criteria. The normative criteria can vary, but the central evaluative obligation
that the concept requires does not. Additionally, the evaluative dimension is
hardly unspecified. The legal concept also indicates the general character that
the evaluation is to take. For example, it excludes aesthetic judgments,
character assessments, political considerations, and criteria relating to legal
status. Furthermore, good faith in contract law is understood to connote
something quite different from the legal concept of reasonableness in torts.
Contract law does not simply say that parties have an obligation to behave
reasonably. Instead, it says that they need to act in good faith. The definition
in turn focuses on the elements of honesty and fairness, suggesting that the
evaluation has as much to do with a party’s motives and intentions as its
outward manifestation.
The combination of the stable jural meaning and the flexible normative
meaning with which common law concepts can be imbued creates an
important equilibrium. This equilibrium allows the common law to guide
behavior, promote reliance, and ground decisionmaking, while at the same
time remaining open and receptive to competing normative theories and
values. The equilibrium is relatively robust, which explains the endurance of
the common law’s core architecture of concepts for centuries. It has enabled
the common law to respond to changing social preferences and conditions
without abolishing its core concepts.
Of course, to introduce the requisite degree of adaptiveness to varying
preferences and criteria, judges have over the years employed several legal
techniques to vary the meaning of individual concepts without altogether
destabilizing the core jural understanding and function of those concepts
within common law doctrine. It is to the analysis of these techniques—which
together reflect the dynamic side of the equilibrium just described—that we
next turn.
B. Normative Change in the Common Law
The success of the common law—both as a body of law and as a method
of lawmaking—can be attributed in large measure to its ability to keep up
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with changing social values and preferences over extended periods of time.
The common law, in other words, is susceptible to change. Yet change can
come about in two distinct forms, and it is important to differentiate
between them. On the one hand, change in the law can be at the level of
legal rules (i.e., doctrinal).139 This form of change involves the process of
modifying the jural content of individual rules, by making alterations at the
margins, adding altogether new rules, or at times eliminating old rules.
While this form of change is certainly present in the common law, it is
somewhat less commonly seen, since extensive recourse to it runs the risk of
undermining the very working of the common law, which in turn depends
on the ideals of tradition and consistency at the level of doctrine. More
frequently seen is the process of change at the normative level—best
described as “normative change.”
Unlike doctrinal change, normative change entails change occurring not
in the actual content or structure of the common law’s individual doctrinal
mechanisms but instead at the level of normative meaning, embodied in the
common law’s conceptual structure.140 Normative change, in other words,
operates through the interaction between the jural and normative meanings
of the common law’s different concepts, which in turn enables common law
doctrine to accommodate and affirm changing social values, and ideals
without having to alter the actual doctrinal content of the law. Change of
this kind is critical to the functioning and legitimacy of the common law
insofar as it allows the law to keep up with the needs of society, and at the
same time remain firmly anchored (as a doctrinal matter) in relatively stable
practice. And it is once again the common law’s conceptual edifice that
enables such normative change.
One might, of course, object that the distinction we are drawing,
between doctrinal and normative change, is less clear in practice than we
make it out to be and that in many situations the two do in fact go hand in
hand. A doctrinal change—involving, say, an alteration in an individual
rule—might indeed be motivated by a change in normative ideal or value.141

139 For a discussion of common law doctrinal change, see Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in
the Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal Change in a Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601 (2001);
Rubin, supra note 4.
140 For a previous account of normative change, see Kraus, supra note 97, at 327.
141 As an example, consider the emergence of contributory negligence doctrine in tort law.
See Francis H. Bohlen, Contributory Negligence, 21 HARV. L. REV. 233, 254 (1908) (discussing the
origins of contributory negligence in nineteenth-century tort law); Wex S. Malone, The Formative
Era of Contributory Negligence, 41 ILL. L. REV. 151, 154-55 (1946) (linking the sudden rise of
contributory negligence to the rapid expansion of railroads and tort lawsuits against common
carriers).
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We fully accept this possibility. Yet our simple point is that, at multiple
points in its development, the common law goes through a process of
change without exhibiting any overt or patent alterations to its form and
jural structure. On the face of things, one might thus think that the law has
remained altogether static, since no actual doctrinal modification has
occurred. Our claim is merely that this need not be always true and that
even when the common law does not exhibit variation in form and
structure, it can nonetheless undergo important changes at the normative
level, which can obviate the need for alterations at the doctrinal level.
The process of normative change allows the common law to be overtly
pluralist in its functioning. This form of “functional pluralism” stands in
stark contrast to structural pluralism, a form of pluralism that is associated
with the common law.142 Structural pluralism posits that the diversity of
legal institutions and doctrines in the common law allows it to embrace a
diversity of values, insofar as individuals are allowed to choose among these
various institutions (and therefore values).143 Premised on the overarching
value of autonomy, structural pluralism situates the common law’s pluralism
in its doctrinal structure.144 In so doing, it is forced to rely entirely on
doctrinal change in order to realize any alterations in social values and
ideals. By contrast, functional pluralism—of the kind that we offer and
defend here—situates the common law’s commitment to pluralism in its
actual functioning rather than in its structure. It explains how the common
law’s process of normative change, modulated through its conceptual
architecture, allows individual doctrinal areas to affirm and embrace
different normative values over time and context.
We identify three principal ways in which normative change occurs in
the common law through the use of legal concepts: interpretive change,
interconceptual change, and additive change. Each of these methods of
normative change relies fundamentally on the relationship between the jural
and normative meanings of legal concepts, a relationship that judges
effectively deploy to stabilize the content of the law while altering its
contextual meaning. This Section describes and illustrates each of these
mechanisms.
142 Functional pluralism, as used here, should not be confused with its philosophical analog,
an idea commonly associated with the work of Michael Lynch. See MICHAEL P. LYNCH, TRUE
TO LIFE : WHY TRUTH MATTERS (2004) (developing a contextual theory of truth); Gila Sher,
Functional Pluralism, 46 PHIL. BOOKS 311 (2005) (reviewing LYNCH, supra) (critiquing Michael
Lynch’s functional pluralist account of truth).
143 For a prominent recent account of structural pluralism, see DAGAN, supra note 101, at 193-223;
Hanoch Dagan, Pluralism and Perfectionism in Private Law, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1409, 1421 (2012).
144 See Dagan, supra note 143, at 1424.
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1. Interpretive Change
Interpretive change is perhaps the most common mechanism through
which normative change comes about in the common law. At its simplest, it
entails a court imbuing a legal concept with new normative meaning while
keeping the jural meaning of the concept static. All the same, the process
involves a subtlety that is often ignored.
As described previously, the jural and normative meanings of a legal
concept are in equilibrium with one another at any given point in time.145
There thus exists a shared understanding of the jural meaning of the concept
among most legal actors. In addition, concepts often have a dominant normative meaning that emerges from authoritative judicial pronouncements. The
process of interpretive change involves altering the equilibrium between the
concept’s jural meaning and normative meaning. In essence, the process can be
broken down into two steps. In the first step, a court interprets the prevailing
normative meaning of the legal concept in a way that brings it into close (if not
complete) alignment with the concept’s jural meaning. In so doing, the opentextured nature of the legal concept renders it indeterminate or vague insofar
as its application to the specific context in question goes. This in turn produces
the second step, which involves the court infusing the jural meaning of the
concept with a new normative orientation. Almost always, the two steps occur
contemporaneously even though they remain jurally distinct.
The process of interpretive change is in many ways just as much a
rhetorical strategy as it is a process of common law interpretation. In addition,
since the focus is entirely on the internal dynamics of the legal concept (i.e., its
duality of meaning), it is in essence a form of intraconceptual normative
change. Thus, if a is the jural meaning of the concept, and n1 its prevailing
normative meaning at time T1; at time T2 when the court seeks to introduce
the normative change, the steps are: first, n1 is interpreted to be as close as
possible to a (i.e., n1→a), as a result of which it is rendered indeterminate in
application, requiring a second step, that a is in turn interpreted in terms of n2
in order to render it applicable to the particular context in question. The
process is best illustrated through a few examples.
Consider first the common law of nuisance in England at the turn of the
nineteenth century.146 At the turn of the century, nuisance law placed great
emphasis on the concept of a “reasonable use” which operated as the
lynchpin of the action in individual disputes. 147 The concept invariably
145
146

See supra text accompanying notes 141-142.
See generally John P. S. McLaren, Nuisance Law and the Industrial Revolution—Some Lessons
from Social History, 3 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 155 (1983).
147 See William L. Prosser, Nuisance Without Fault, 20 TEX. L. REV. 399, 418-20 (1942).
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entailed a reasonableness-based balancing exercise. Yet, by the mid-1800s, most
courts had come to interpret the concept as weighing the plaintiff’s alleged
harm against the “general and minimal standards of comfort.”148 The basic
requirements of living were thus deemed to be the appropriate baseline against
which the defendant’s actions were to be measured. Altogether missing in this
analysis was any consideration of the potential benefits that the defendant’s
actions might entail and the feasibility of its being performed or undertaken at
an alternative location.149 Such an approach would obviously involve infusing
the common law of nuisance with a distinctively utilitarian overtone insofar as
it now measured the actual benefits of the defendant’s actions, regardless of the
unfairness of the plaintiff’s harm, the primary concern under the pre-existing
formulation of an “unreasonable interference.”
The old approach—of focusing on the plaintiff ’s harm and measuring it
against the minimal standards of comfort—looked entirely to the fairness of
the plaintiff ’s claim, and operated under the basic recognition that the
plaintiff had a pre-existing right to comfortably enjoy his property, with the
only question remaining being whether such enjoyment was indeed possible
in light of the defendant’s actions.150 This standard altogether disregarded
any independent value that the defendant’s actions might produce, despite
its causing the plaintiff actual harm. In the mid-nineteenth century, an
important (but short-lived) English decision sought to alter this standard.
In Hole v. Barlow, the court was motivated by utilitarian considerations,
which it saw as altogether absent under the prior standard.151 The court thus
observed that under the existing standard the “great manufacturing towns of
England would be full of persons bringing actions for nuisances arising from
the carrying on of noxious or offensive trades in their vicinity, to the great
injury of the manufacturing and social interests of the community.”152 Instead
of overtly claiming to then change the law to address this concern, the court
thereafter looked to the concept of “reasonable use,” which courts had utilized
in conjunction with the concept of the “unreasonable interference” in prior
cases.153 It concluded that in situations of a “reasonable use, of a lawful trade
in a convenient and proper place, even though some one may suffer
annoyance from its being so carried on,” no claim for nuisance would lie.154

148
149
150
151
152
153
154

Brenner, supra note 29, at 410.
Id.
See, e.g., Walter v. Selfe, (1851) 64 Eng. Rep. 849 (Ch.) 852; 4 De G. & Sm. 315, 322-24.
(1858) 140 Eng. Rep. 1113 (C.P.) 1117; 4 C. B. N. S. 334, 342-43.
Id. at 1114.
Id.
Id.
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Scholars have described Hole as a “radical departure from previous law”
and have observed that “under the guise of semantic continuity, an actual
change in the law itself did occur.”155 This is precisely the normative change
that the court brought about. On the face of things, no overt change in the
jural structure of nuisance doctrine occurred. The concept of “reasonable use”
formed the focus of the court’s analysis. What the court in effect did was to
treat the prevailing normative meaning of the concept (of reasonable use) as
sufficiently indeterminate (i.e., as being no different from its jural meaning),
which required no more than a balancing exercise that scrutinized the use
against a baseline. It then proceeded to eliminate (or solve) that indeterminacy
by infusing the concept with a new normative meaning, which would satisfy
the minimal requirements of the concept’s jural meaning. “General and
minimal” standards of comfort, which formed the pre-existing normative
meaning, was first equated with the sufficiently vague idea of “reasonable
use,” which the court then replaced with “convenient and proper place” as the
new normative standard that would enable the doctrine to now accommodate
avowedly utilitarian considerations.156 Later courts, to be sure, came to disagree
with the court’s decision in Hole, preferring instead to emphasize fairness—
rather than utilitarian—considerations in the working of nuisance law. 157
Interestingly enough, their reasoning too relied on the ideas of “reasonable use”
and “unreasonable interference,” thereby effectively preserving the doctrinal
content of nuisance law and the jural meaning of the legal concept in question
while nonetheless effecting an important normative change.158
A second example is seen in the law of riparian rights as it evolved in
nineteenth-century America. By the early nineteenth century, riparian
rights in the United States generally followed what scholars describe as the
“natural right theory” or the idea of a “natural flow.”159 According to this
approach, courts allowed riparian owners to use a stream at will, as long as
they did not interfere with the natural flow of the stream beyond minimal
levels needed for their domestic use, agriculture, or animal husbandry.160 In
155
156
157

Brenner, supra note 29, at 409, 411.
Hole, 140 Eng. Rep. at 1114.
See St. Helen’s Smelting Co. v. Tipping, (1865) 11 Eng. Rep. (H.L.) 1483; 11 H.L.C. 642;
Bamford v. Turnley, (1862) 122 Eng. Rep. 27 (Ex.); 3 B. & S. 66.
158 See, e.g., Bamford, 122 Eng. Rep. at 30 (“It may be observed that . . . there is a want of
precision, especially in the words ‘reasonable’ and ‘convenient,’ which renders its meaning by no
means clear.”).
159 See JOSHUA GETZLER, A HISTORY OF WATER R IGHTS AT COMMON LAW 129-40
(2004) (detailing the development of natural rights theory); MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780–1860, at 34-35 (1977) (explaining the natural
flow theory in the United States).
160 HORWITZ, supra note 159, at 35-40.

2015]

Structure and Value in the Common Law

1279

essence, this approach emphasized the riparian property owners’ exclusive
dominion and the normative ideal of owner-autonomy. Considerations of
efficiency, optimal social use, and the like found little place under this
approach.
A few early courts had sought to deviate from the natural flow approach and
introduce in its stead a balancing test that examined the relative efficiencies of
the owner’s use and the neighbor’s use.161 These deviations were met with
immense criticism from scholars at the time.162 They were seen as abrupt
transformations— and therefore outliers— in the development of the law. All
the same, they rendered salient the importance of moving the law in the
direction of affirming utilitarian, efficiency-based considerations, by balancing
a riparian owner’s entitlement against the needs of downstream uses and
economic development that might maximize overall social welfare (i.e.,
utilitarianism over autonomy). It was not until Justice Story’s famous opinion
in Tyler v. Wilkinson, delivered in 1827, that these normative considerations
were made an actual part of the formal law of riparian ownership, unlike the
prior efforts that had sought to change the doctrine altogether.163 Morton
Horwitz describes Justice Story’s opinion as reflecting the reality that
“[c]ommon lawyers are more comfortable with a process of gradually giving
new meanings to old formulas than with explicitly casting the old doctrines
aside.”164 This was in essence a process of interpretive normative change.
Justice Story begins his opinion by affirming the natural flow approach
as the default position on riparian ownership.165 He then goes on to make
the following observation, which has since been credited with effecting an
important alteration in the law:
When I speak of this common right, I do not mean to be understood as
holding the doctrine, that there can be no diminution whatsoever, and no
obstruction or impediment whatsoever, by a riparian proprietor, in the use
of the water as it flows; for that would be to deny any valuable use of it.
There may be, and there must be allowed of that, which is common to all, a
reasonable use. The true test of the principle and extent of the use is,
whether it is to the injury of the other proprietors or not. . . . The diminution, retardation, or acceleration, not positively and sensibly injurious by

161 See, e.g., Platt v. Johnson, 15 Johns. 213, 218-19 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1818); Palmer v. Mulligan, 3
Cai. 307, 314 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805).
162 See JOSEPH K. ANGELL, A TREATISE ON THE COMMON LAW, IN RELATION TO
WATER-COURSES 40-41 (1824) (describing these developments as “obviously unjust”).
163 24 F. Cas. 472 (Story, Circuit Justice, D.R.I. 1827) (No. 14,312).
164 HORWITZ, supra note 159, at 38 (emphasis added).
165 See Tyler, 24 F. Cas. at 474.
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diminishing the value of the common right, is an implied element in the right of
using the stream at all. The law here, as in many other cases, acts with a
reasonable reference to public convenience and general good, and it is not
betrayed into a narrow strictness, subversive of common sense, nor into an
extravagant looseness, which would destroy private rights.166

In this paragraph, Justice Story is credited with introducing the idea of a
reasonable riparian use into the analysis of riparian rights and with moving
the law in the direction of recognizing efficiency and social welfare considerations as part of the doctrine.167 The genius of his approach lies in the
simple fact that overtly, he effected no change whatsoever in the doctrine or
applicable concepts themselves. Horwitz describes it as the “classically
transitional judicial opinion.”168
On closer analysis, we see how exactly the opinion introduces its desired
normative change interpretively. The prior law had emphasized the existence
of a riparian owner’s “right” and the need to protect it against interferences,
which were characterized as “injuries.” Relying on the idea that every infraction of a right (e.g., the right to exclude) was an injury at law, the natural flow
theory rendered such injuries actionable.169 The jural meaning of the concept
thus entailed the idea of an actionable interference (e.g., “injuria sine damno”),170
and the pre-existing normative meaning situated that concept in the notion of
natural rights and the value of owner autonomy. In Tyler, Justice Story played
on the legal concept of “injury” by admitting that its basic jural meaning
rendered it contextually indeterminate, thereby allowing him to infuse it with
the idea of actual harm (i.e., damage and compensable loss). In this vein, the
leading historical account of water rights at common law argues that the
opinion successfully “transforms strict natural rights into reasonable rights by
playing on the ambiguity of the notion of ‘injury’, both at law and in common
speech.”171 In essence, then, Justice Story’s reasoning accepts the injury-based
rationale of the test but proceeds to treat the idea of an injury as an empirical
question, based on the “value” of the use and the right at issue.172 In so doing,

166
167

Id. (emphasis added).
See GETZLER, supra note 159, at 275-76; HORWITZ, supra note 159, at 39; Carol M. Rose,
Energy and Efficiency in the Realignment of Common-Law Water Rights, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 261, 285-88
(1990).
168 HORWITZ, supra note 159, at 39.
169 For an excellent discussion of the jural moves here, see GETZLER, supra note 159, at 61-63.
170 Id. at 62.
171 Id. at 275.
172 See Tyler v. Willkinson, 24 F. Cas.472, 474 (Story, Circuit Justice, D.R.I. 1827) (No.
14,312) (emphasizing the diminution in “value” of the right).
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it successfully infused the doctrine with distinctively utilitarian considerations
through the process of interpretive normative change.
Interpretive normative change is thus a fairly well-known method of
infusing the common law with new normative ideas and content, without
actually altering the doctrinal content and jural structure of the rules
themselves. As we saw, it relies very heavily on the common law’s conceptual
structure and works with the jural indeterminacy of legal concepts to take
them in new normative directions as circumstances demand.
2. Interconceptual Change
The second method through which normative change comes about in the
common law is best described as the process of interconceptual change (or
as interconceptual salience alteration). In basic terms, this mechanism works
by altering the relative salience of different concepts, all of which are
embedded in a common law doctrine, to the working of that particular
doctrine. Whereas interpretive change effects an alteration of a concept’s own
normative meaning, interconceptual change accepts a concept’s prevailing
normative meaning as a given but either enhances or reduces the influence of
that concept (and its normative meaning) in the overall scheme of the
doctrine.
Common law doctrines routinely entail multiple elements or factors, all of
which courts are required to consider during their analysis and application of
the doctrine.173 Each of these elements in turn commonly embodies distinct
legal concepts, which in turn contain their own jural and normative meanings
as previously described. In interpreting a doctrine, courts do not give factors,
elements, and concepts equal weight. Indeed, just the opposite is true. In
applying a multi-element doctrine, courts usually emphasize one (or more)
elements of a doctrine over others, either explicitly or implicitly. Insofar as
the concepts underlying each of the elements reflect different normative
ideals, this process of emphasizing or deemphasizing one element over
another has the direct effect of raising or lowering that particular concept’s
salience and its associated normative value for the overall doctrine.
Assume that a common law doctrine contains four independent (and cumulative) elements (e1, e2, e3, and e4), each of which in turn embodies a distinct legal
concept (c1, c2, c3, c4). If the concepts emphasize varying normative ideals and
values (n1, n2, n3, n4), the process of emphasizing or deemphasizing one or more
173 For a particularly harsh criticism of multifactor tests and doctrines in the law, see RICHARD
A. POSNER, REFLECTIONS ON JUDGING 262 (2013) (“[W]hen the factors are numerous, unweighted,
and open-ended . . . , a multifactor test is an invitation to the exercise of uncanalized discretionary
authority.”).
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elements (e.g., e3) of the doctrine as more important than the others has the
direct effect of rendering the normative values associated with the concept (c3)
contained in that element (n3) more salient and influential within the overall
analysis of the doctrine. Indeed, we see this occurring somewhat frequently in
the common law, when courts come to treat one element of a multi-element
doctrine as more important than others and in the process raise the salience of
the legal concept embedded within that particular element. The following
examples are illustrative.
The doctrine of adverse possession is without a doubt the most striking
and controversial way of acquiring property rights in realty and personality.174
It effectively allows trespassers to divest rightful owners of their ownership
rights and acquire good title to assets that they initially wrongfully possessed.
For this to occur, the doctrine requires that the possession be actual, open and
notorious, hostile (or adverse), exclusive, and continuous for the statutory
period.175 These requirements are considered the “elements” of the doctrine,
but they each originate in an important conceptual device with its own jural
and normative content.176
Given the somewhat draconian nature of adverse possession as a mechanism of acquiring ownership, as a historical matter courts treated the element
of hostility as especially important in the analysis since it allowed them to
police the behavior and motives of the claimant.177 The normative ideal of
fairness remained at the core of this emphasis. This perspective reigned
supreme when land records were poor and innocent third parties stumbled
into others’ land and cultivated it, believing in good faith that there was no
wrongdoing involved in their actions. 178 The law of adverse possession
sought to benefit these putatively innocent occupiers by protecting their
labor and reliance interests. Jurally, the legal concept of hostility focused on
the intent of the adverse possessor towards the original owner and the asset

174 See, e.g., Henry W. Ballantine, Title by Adverse Possession, 32 HARV. L. REV. 135, 135 (1918)
(“Title by adverse possession sounds, at first blush, like title by theft or robbery, a primitive
method of acquiring land without paying for it.”).
175 16 RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 91.02 (Michael Allan Wolf
ed., LexisNexis Matthew Bender 2014); THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, THE
OXFORD INTRODUCTIONS TO U.S. LAW: PROPERTY 34-35 (2010); see also Henry Winthrop
Ballantine, Claim of Title in Adverse Possession, 28 YALE L.J. 219, 219 (1919).
176 16 POWELL, supra note 175, §§ 91.02-.07.
177 See Helmholz, supra note 33, at 337-341 (discussing the role of hostility and mistaken belief
in the adverse possession analysis); William Sternberg, The Element of Hostility in Adverse
Possession, 6 TEMPLE L.Q. 207, 207 (1931) (describing hostility as the “most frequently contested
element of adverse possession”).
178 See Sternberg, supra note 177, at 215 (citing precedent from 1840 adopting a largely
analogous view).
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in question, and examined the adverse possessor’s state of mind. Courts
emphasizing the element originally seemed to suggest that considerations of
fairness required that only adverse possessors who acted in good faith, on the
honest albeit erroneous belief that they were possessing their own land, could
avail themselves of the doctrine.179 These courts used the element (and its
underlying concept of “hostility” or that the possession be “adverse”) to deny
other claimants any relief; again, in the belief that the fairness ideals underlying
the doctrine were best served by this approach.180
More recently, the fairness justification for adverse possession has begun
to lose ground and an efficiency-based rationale has begun to gain sway. In
this perspective, the goal of adverse possession is to put land to productive
use, accomplishing this by simultaneously (1) penalizing slothful owners
who allow their land to lay fallow and (2) incentivizing third parties to seek
such fallow land and make efficient use of it.181 On this view, not only was
the good faith (i.e., mistaken belief) of the possessor irrelevant, but an
affirmative bad faith—wherein the actor knew he or she was trespassing on
another’s property—was preferable. A minority of courts thus tried altering
the very normative meaning of the concept of hostility to require a showing
of bad faith, all in order to further their utilitarian emphasis.182 This process
was in essence an attempt to bring about normative change interpretively.

179 This position came to be known as the Connecticut rule. See French v. Pearce, 8 Conn. 439,
445 (1831) (“The possession is not the less adverse, because the person possessed intentionally, though
innocently. But in the moral nature of the act, there is undoubtedly a difference, when the possessor
knowingly enters by wrong.”). For further discussion, see Helmholz, supra note 33, at 337-49. For
cases accepting this position, see Mannillo v. Gorski, 255 A.2d 258 (N.J. 1969); West v. Tilley, 306
N.Y.S.2d 591 (N.Y. App. Div. 1970); Brehm v. Johnson, 531 P.2d 991 (Colo. Ct. App. 1974).
180 See, e.g., Eddings v. Black, 602 S.W.2d 353, 358 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980) (concluding that
where claimant had knowledge of a prior claim (i.e., was not acting in good faith), the adverse
possession claim was “wanting in intrinsic fairness”).
181 See Fennell, supra note 33, at 1059-60 (describing the true niche goal of adverse possession
as “moving land into the hands of a (much) higher-valuing user, where ordinary markets cannot
accomplish that task”). But see Jeffrey Evans Stake, The Uneasy Case for Adverse Possession, 89 GEO.
L.J. 2419, 2435-36 (2001) (critiquing this rationale by discussing times when “productive use can be
undesirable”); Thomas W. Merrill, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Adverse Possession, 79 NW. U.
L. REV. 1122, 1130-31 (1985) (offering a similar critique).
182 This approach came to be known as the Maine rule. See Preble v. Maine Cent. R.R. Co., 27
A. 149, 150-51 (Me. 1893) (“It is not merely the existence of a mistake, but the presence or absence of
the requisite intention to claim title, that fixes the character of the entry and determines the question
of disseisin.”), overruled by Dombkowski v. Ferland, 893 A.2d 599 (Me. 2006); see also Sternberg, supra
note 177, at 213-14 (discussing the early Maine rule, where “there can be no adverse possession when
there is a mistaken belief of ownership”). For an argument that efficiency demands an adherence to
this rule, see Fennell, supra note 33, at 1038-39.
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In due course, however, this approach failed to garner support.183 When this
occurred, advocates of the normative change—towards utilitarianism—
adopted an alternative strategy—namely, seeking such change through an
interconceptual salience alteration.
Instead of seeking to reinterpret the concept of hostility in terms of bad
faith, courts came to adopt the view that the element of hostility, with its
emphasis on the possessor’s state of mind, was altogether irrelevant to the
adverse possession analysis.184 In its place, they elevated the element of
actual possession and the concept of “actuality” underlying it.185 Jurally,
actual possession requires the court to undertake a factual and empirical
examination of the nature of the possessor’s use to see if the possessor
behaves as a standard owner would.186 In a vast majority of cases, all actual
possession required was the enclosure or improvement of the relevant tract.
Clearly, the concept of actuality is more consistent with the utilitarian
justification for adverse possession, insofar as it privileges the possessor’s
actual use of the land. By emphasizing the importance of “actuality” over
“hostility” in adverse possession, this approach ensured that the doctrine as
a whole came to affirm the utilitarian ideal of effective land use rather than
the doctrine’s original fairness goals. 187 One element and concept (i.e.,
actual possession, and actuality) was emphasized, while another (i.e.,
hostility) was simultaneously deemphasized, in the process rendering salient
the normative ideals associated with the former.
A second example of interconceptual normative change is seen in the
federal common law of copyright, specifically the famed fair use doctrine. The
fair use doctrine sanctions certain unauthorized uses of copyrighted works

183 R.H. Helmholz, More on Subjective Intent: A Response to Professor Cunningham, 64 WASH.
U. L.Q. 65, 83 (1986) (discussing how American courts have moved away from the bad faith
requirement).
184 See Chaplin v. Sanders, 676 P.2d 431, 435-36 (Wash. 1984) (en banc) (observing that the
adverse possessor’s “subjective belief regarding his true interest in the land and his intent to
dispossess or not dispossess another is irrelevant to this determination”); 16 POWELL, supra note
175, § 91.05[1][a] (discussing the majority understanding of hostile as referring to actions and not
intent).
185 Chaplin, 676 P.2d at 436 (“The nature of his possession will be determined solely on the
basis of the manner in which he treats the property.”).
186 16 POWELL, supra note 175, § 91.03 (“[T]he claimant must use and possess the land to the
same extent as a record owner would, in light of the property’s particular attributes.”).
187 The clearest statement to this effect is to be found in a decision of the Supreme Court of
Washington. See Chaplin, 676 P.2d at 435 (“The doctrine of adverse possession was formulated at
law for the purpose of, among others, assuring maximum utilization of land, encouraging the
rejection of stale claims and, most importantly, quieting titles.”).
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that would otherwise constitute copyright infringement.188 In adjudicating fair
use cases, courts are required to consider four factors: First, they must consider
the purpose of the defendant’s allegedly infringing use, including whether the
use is commercial or not and whether it is transformative in nature.189 Second,
they must take account of the nature of the plaintiff’s copyrighted work.190
Third, they have to weigh the amount and substantiality of the defendant’s
appropriation.191 Finally, they must assess the copying’s impact on the actual
and potential market for the plaintiff’s copyrighted work.192
While fair use is today codified in the Copyright Act, it emerged from
the decisions of common law and equity courts.193 Indeed, Justice Story is
commonly credited with originating the doctrine in his now famous opinion
in Folsom v. Marsh.194 Even while codifying the fair use doctrine, Congress
intended that courts continue to develop it as they had done before, in
traditional common law style through the “process of accretion.”195 Indeed,
the legislative history accompanying the codification indicates that Congress
mandated that “the courts must be free to adapt the doctrine to particular
situations on a case-by-case basis.”196 A review of the courts’ application and
development of fair use jurisprudence since its codification reveals an
ongoing tussle between the normative ideals of fairness and autonomy, and
efficiency.197 And in this tussle, we see courts effectively employing the
mechanism of interconceptual change to mold the doctrine along the lines
of their preferred normative goal.
Early in the development of the doctrine, the rough idea of fairness—
manifested in the notion of consumer autonomy—dominated the framing of
188 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012) (“[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work . . . is not an
infringement of copyright.”). See generally WILLIAM F. PATRY, THE FAIR USE PRIVILEGE IN
COPYRIGHT LAW (1985).
189 17 U.S.C. § 107(1).
190 Id. § 107(2) (“[T]he nature of the copyrighted work.”).
191 Id. § 107(3) (“[T]he amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole.”).
192 Id. § 107(4).
193 See Matthew Sag, The Prehistory of Fair Use, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 1371, 1379-87, 1393-1409
(2011) (arguing that the true origins of the doctrine can be traced back to common law and equity
decisions in the period between 1741 and 1841).
194 9 F. Cas. 342 (Story, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Mass 1841) (No. 4901); see also Oren Bracha,
The Ideology of Authorship Revisited: Authors, Markets, and Liberal Values in Early American Copyright,
118 YALE L.J. 186, 229-30 (2008) (discussing the impact of Folsom v. Marsh on copyright thinking).
See generally L. Ray Patterson, Folsom v. Marsh and its Legacy, 5 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 431 (1998)
(criticizing the decision in Folsom v. Marsh).
195 H.R. R EP. NO. 94-1476, at 66 (1976).
196 Id.
197 See Gideon Parchomovsky, Fair Use, Efficiency, and Corrective Justice, 3 LEGAL THEORY
347, 350-54 (1997).
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the doctrine. One of the principal ways in which this was realized by courts was
through an emphasis on the first fair use factor, which looks at the purpose of
the defendant’s use. In Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,198 the
Supreme Court did precisely this. In emphasizing that the defendant’s actions
amounted to a fair use, the Court focused on the first factor and tied it to the
concept of commercialism, noting that “every commercial use of copyrighted
material is presumptively an unfair exploitation of the monopoly privilege that
belongs to the owner of the copyright.”199 By converting commercialism into
the cornerstone of the first fair use factor and implicitly making it the most
salient factor in the analysis, the Court was able to find for the defendants, since
their use was for a noncommercial purpose. In the process, the Court’s ideals of
consumer autonomy and fairness were emphasized.
A year later, the Supreme Court revisited the fair use doctrine in Harper
& Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises.200 As scholars have long pointed
out, the Court’s decision in the case was unquestionably swayed by the
effect that the defendant’s actions had had on the market for the plaintiff ’s
work. When the defendant copied and published its work, the plaintiff lost
its lucrative book deal and a host of other economic benefits to which it
would have otherwise been entitled.201 In the Court’s view, finding the
defendant’s actions to be fair use would be inefficient and harmful to social
welfare. In its own analysis now, the Court unequivocally proclaimed that
the fourth (as opposed to the first) fair use factor was “undoubtedly the
single most important element of fair use.”202 The fourth factor has long
been known to embody the concept of “market effect,” which entails a
scrutiny of the economic harm that the defendant’s copying imposes on the
plaintiff.203 In no uncertain terms, the Court even connected the concept of
market effect to efficiency considerations, citing to economic literature on
the question. 204 Upon so doing, the Court concluded that the fair use
analysis needed to emphasize the normative ideal of economic efficiency,
which in the end favored the plaintiff.
In both instances, we see the Court raising the salience of one element
or factor over others in the analysis and then highlighting an important
conceptual device embedded within its preferred factor. Then, using the
normative ideals associated with that concept (or its normative meaning),
198
199
200
201
202
203
204

464 U.S. 417 (1984), superseded on other grounds by statute, 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2012).
Id. at 451.
471 U.S. 539 (1985).
Id. at 567.
Id. at 566.
See 17 U.S.C. § 107(4).
Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 566 n.9.
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the Court is able to render that normative goal pervasively influential in the
overall fair use analysis. In Sony, the Court emphasized the concept of
“commercialism” over all other concepts, while in Harper & Row, the Court
emphasized “market effect” over commercialism and other concepts or
ideals. This was in essence the process of interconceptual normative change.
We see the Court continuing to use the vehicle of interconceptual change
in later fair use decisions as well. The 1990s saw far-reaching changes in the
production and dissemination of expressive content. The emergence of new
technologies allowed creators to freely borrow from pre-existing works in the
process of creating new ones, a paradigm colorfully described by some as
“remix.”205 This paradigm gained instant popularity in the world of music.
Creators in other areas were quick to follow suit and many academics called
on the copyright system to enable the new creative paradigm on grounds of
individual autonomy.
In Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,206 the Court was asked to determine
the legality of this practice using the fair use doctrine. In deciding to emphasize the ideal of individual autonomy in the creative process, the Court chose to
simultaneously deemphasize both the notion of commercialism and efficiency
considerations standing on their own. Drawing on academic literature, it thus
developed the concept of “transformative[ness],” which it read into the first fair
use factor.207 Upon doing so, the Court then reasoned that this concept—
embedded into the first factor—was of such importance that “the more
transformative the new work, the less will be the significance of other factors,
like commercialism, that may weigh against a finding of fair use,”208 in effect
suggesting that the concept of transformativeness ought to trump both
commercialism and market efficiency. Once again then, we see the use of the
interconceptual method in fair use in order to realize a normative change in
the doctrine: from market efficiency back to individual creative autonomy.209
Interconceptual change is thus a frequently adopted mode of normative
change in relation to common law doctrines that consist of multiple elements
or factors. It relies heavily on the connection between each element and a
specific conceptual device embedded within it and works by altering the
205 See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, REMIX: MAKING ART AND COMMERCE THRIVE
IN THE HYBRID ECONOMY (2008).
206 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
207 Id. at 579.
208 Id.
209 See C. Edwin Baker, First Amendment Limits on Copyright, 55 VAND. L. REV. 891, 941

(2002) (associating transformativeness with free speech); Rebecca Tushnet, Essay, Copy This Essay:
How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech and How Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535, 549-52
(2004) (discussing the connection between transformativeness and free speech).
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relative salience to the doctrine of the different elements—and with it the
different concepts and their normative underpinnings.
3. Additive Change
A third mechanism of concept-reliant normative change in the common
law involves the process of introducing an altogether new conceptual device
into an area of doctrine, with the express understanding that the new
concept embodies a normative ideal that is seen as beneficial and worthy of
consideration within that particular area. In other words, it entails the
addition of a new concept to the area in question, in the process imbuing
that concept with a specific jural—and normative—meaning.
The concept being introduced to the area in question need not be
completely new in the sense of being altogether invented for this particular
purpose. To the contrary, in most situations, the concept is one that is taken
from another area of doctrine and modified sufficiently to meet the purposes
of the new area. It therefore can partake of what scholars have described as the
phenomenon of interdoctrinal borrowing.210 What is important to appreciate
in the process of additive change, however, is that the introduction of the new
concept is rarely ever open-ended and purely jural—in the sense of merely
injecting the concept into the area without a clear sense of how it will be used
or the normative ideals with which it will be infused. To the contrary, the very
molding of the concept imbues it with a distinct jural meaning and a
sufficiently stable normative meaning (for the area), which its originators see
as important to the substantive doctrinal area in question.
As mechanisms of normative change in the common law go, additive change
is perhaps the most overt and direct. It is for this reason that it is somewhat
rare, especially in comparison to both interpretive and interconceptual change,
both of which are far subtler in nature. Additive change in the common law
amounts to a direct process of judicial lawmaking, which common law courts
are only rarely comfortable admitting to, whereas both interpretive and
interconceptual change can be seen as mechanisms of legal interpretation that
fit well with the assumptions of the declaratory theory of common law
adjudication. The following examples illustrate the working of this method.
The law of landlord–tenant relations has long been characterized by a
disparity in bargaining positions between landlord and tenant. This disparity
210 See generally Edward Rock & Michael Wachter, Dangerous Liaisons: Corporate Law, Trust
Law, and Interdoctrinal Legal Transplants, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 651 (2002) (offering a critique of the
interdoctrinal borrowing of concepts and rules); Nelson Tebbe & Robert L. Tsai, Constitutional
Borrowing, 108 MICH. L. REV. 459 (2010) (providing examples of interdoctrinal borrowing in the
area of constitutional law).
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is especially acute in the context of residential housing where landlords are
seen to be motivated almost exclusively by economic considerations, while
tenants are driven by concerns that affect their everyday living situation.211 As
scholars have noted, efforts to cure this inequality have characterized the
very development of landlord–tenant law in the United States.212 One of
the most important developments in this regard emerged in the year 1970
under the doctrine of the implied warranty of habitability, which in turn
revolved around the concept of “habitability.”213
In Javins v. First National Realty Corp., a set of residential tenants sought to
withhold their rent payments when the landlord refused to make a series of
important repairs to the premises. 214 Acknowledging the gross disparity
between landlords and tenants in the region, Judge Skelly Wright approached
his analysis with the observation that “the common law itself must recognize
the landlord’s obligation to keep his premises in a habitable condition.”215 He
then concluded that “a warranty of habitability [must] be implied into all
contracts for urban dwellings,” and that the content of the local housing code
should inform this warranty.216 Thus emerged the doctrine of the implied
warranty of habitability, which imposed a new duty on all residential landlords
to ensure that their premises were maintained in a habitable condition at all
times. This duty in turn originated in the concept of “habitability,” reflecting
the jural idea that a putative residential dwelling had to be evaluated by certain
external criteria for its suitability as a residence.
Javins is universally credited with having introduced the implied warranty
of habitability, and the very concept of habitability, into the common law of
residential leases.217 In addition, there remains little uncertainty about what
Judge Wright was seeking to achieve through its introduction. He was driven
almost entirely by the desire to cure what he saw as the substantive inequality
embodied in the residential landlord–tenant relationship and to imbue the

211 See Mary Ann Glendon, The Transformation of American Landlord–Tenant Law, 23 B.C. L.
REV. 503, 508-11 (1982) (discussing this disparity).
212 See, e.g., 2 POWELL, supra note 175, § 16B.01 (discussing the landlord–tenant revolution);
Edward H. Rabin, The Revolution in Residential Landlord–Tenant Law: Causes and Consequences, 69
CORNELL L. REV. 517, 545 (1984) (attributing the development of landlord–tenant law to societal
forces aimed at improving the perceived inadequacies of housing law).
213 See Super, supra note 37, at 451 (describing the events leading up to the development of
the implied warranty of habitability); see also James Charles Smith, Tenant Remedies for Breach of
Habitability: Tort Dimensions of a Contract Concept, 35 U. KAN. L. REV. 505, 534-46 (1987) (rooting
the concept of habitability in tort law).
214 428 F.2d 1071, 1073 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
215 Id. at 1077.
216 Id. at 1080 (footnote omitted).
217 See 2 POWELL, supra note 175, § 16B.04[2][a].
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regime governing that relationship with the ideal of substantive transactional
equality. Transactional equality was thus his principal normative goal, and the
concept of habitability was a perfect vehicle for it. As Javins conceived of it,
the concept of habitability was meant to force not just an evaluation of the
premises but also an evaluation in terms of its tenant-friendliness, so as to
ensure equality in contracting positions. The concept of habitability—as
articulated by Javins and later cases—was thus intrinsically aligned with the
normative ideals of tenant protection and tenant equality, and it overtly
introduced these ideals into the law.
A second example involves the common law’s set of interests that are
identified by the concept of “quasi-property.” In a variety of situations, the
common law allows an individual to exclude others from an object or resource,
without endowing that individual with the full set of rights over that object
that are characterized by the idea of property (e.g., the right to alienate).218 In
these situations, common law courts have employed the concept of “quasiproperty” to develop a jural basis for the exclusion and, in addition, have
endowed the idea with a specific normative meaning contextually. The most
prominent instance where this has occurred is in relation to the law of unfair
competition, the “hot news” misappropriation doctrine.219
In International News Service v. Associated Press, the question was whether
a collector of time-sensitive factual information (i.e., news) could prevent a
competitor from freeriding on its collection efforts until such time as it
published its findings and reaped the economic benefits from its efforts.220
Recognizing a regular ownership interest in such information would have
entailed a set of consequences that the Court wanted to avoid—such as
whether the right could be used to control the flow of such information,
whether members of the consuming public could be precluded from using
it, etc.221 Instead, what the Court nonetheless recognized as crucial was
developing a mechanism to prevent one competitor from freeriding on the
efforts of another, in the recognition that such freeriding was economically
harmful to the news-collection industry as a whole.222 The Court in International News Service therefore developed the misappropriation doctrine,
which allowed for an action to be brought against a freeriding competitor
for a limited duration. Firmly embedded within the doctrine was the
218
219

Balganesh, Quasi-Property, supra note 38, at 1891.
For a fuller account of the doctrine, see Shyamkrishna Balganesh, “Hot News”: The Enduring
Myth of Property in News, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 419 (2011) [hereinafter Balganesh, “Hot News”]
220 248 U.S. 215, 232 (1918).
221 See Balganesh, “Hot News,” supra note 219, at 429-38 (providing a historical account of the
development of the “hot news” misappropriation doctrine).
222 Id. at 438-56.
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concept of quasi-property, which the Court used to describe the nature of
the interest that the plaintiff newsgatherer had over the information in
question. Or, as Justice Pitney famously put it in his majority opinion:
Regarding the news, therefore, as but the material out of which both parties are
seeking to make profits at the same time and in the same field, we hardly can
fail to recognize that for this purpose, and as between them, it must be regarded
as quasi property, irrespective of the rights of either as against the public.223

It is crucial to appreciate what the Court was doing by introducing the concept
of quasi-property into the discussion. First, it was offering up a jural basis for
the claimant’s entitlement to exclude a freeriding competitor. Quasi-property
represents a relational entitlement that situationally entitles its holder to
exclude another from an identifiable resource.224 Second, the Court was also
endowing this interest with a distinct normative basis—rooted in the avoidance
of freeriding, in order to preserve the efficiencies of the newsgathering
industry.225 The normative basis of the concept, as the Court applied it to the
case, was thus rooted in utilitarian considerations. It is questionable whether a
desultory reliance on the idea of property might have enabled the Court to
inject distinctively utilitarian—as opposed to moral—considerations into the
analysis. The concept of quasi-property proved to be a perfect addition to the
debate in order to realize this objective.
Interestingly enough, the concept of quasi-property has been introduced
into other doctrinal contexts, where it has been understood as embodying
the same jural meaning but with a different normative content. Its role in
grounding the right of sepulcher is a good example. The right of sepulcher
refers to the rights that family members have over the corpse of a deceased
relative.226 These rights normally extend to being able to bury the corpse,
perform all necessary last rites, and determine how to dispose of the mortal
remains. It also, very importantly, entitles a holder to commence an action
against third parties for unauthorized interferences with the corpse, on the
assumption that such interferences produce extensive mental anguish for
the relatives.227

223
224
225

International News Service, 248 U.S. at 236.
Balganesh, Quasi-Property, supra note 38, at 1891.
For a fuller discussion of this reality and the background conditions that motivated the
Court’s reasoning, see Balganesh, “Hot News,” supra note 219, at 443-48.
226 For an extended treatment, see Tanya K. Hernandez, The Property of Death, 60 U. PITT.
L. REV. 971 (1999).
227 See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND K EETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 12, at 63 (5th ed. 1984).
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In developing these rights, common law courts across the United States
have relied extensively on the concept of quasi-property, understanding it to
represent a non-ownership-based entitlement over an object (i.e., the corpse)
that entitles its holder to exclude others from it.228 Interestingly, though, their
normative reason for relying on the concept appears to have been largely nonutilitarian. It was rooted instead in the interest of protecting family members
from the emotional and psychological anguish that interferences with the
corpse might generate, without overtly commodifying the entitlement as a
form of property. 229 The concept of quasi-property in this context—as
developed by courts—thus assumed a different normative meaning from the
concept as used in the unfair competition setting. Here, it partook of distinctly
moral concerns, even though its jural structure remained the same as in the
unfair competition context. This divergence in normative meaning between
the two areas brings home the core idea described earlier about the duality of
meanings that concepts routinely carry. This is not to suggest that courts
introducing the concept into the discussion of sepulcher rights were doing so
without a clear sense of the concept’s intended normative meaning. To the
contrary, they saw the concept as sufficiently jurally stable so as to enable it to
carry their intended normative meaning, rooted as it was in considerations of
dignity and emotional harm. In so doing, the concept served their purpose of
introducing a dignitary entitlement over the object into the area without
simultaneously commodifying that relationship. In short, the concept effected
an additive normative change.
Before moving on, it is worth noting that the process of additive change,
unlike the two previous mechanisms of change, usually involves a direct
doctrinal change to the law as well. In this respect, additive change therefore
combines both mechanisms of doctrinal and normative change. Nevertheless,
its primary impetus unquestionably remains the need to introduce new or

228 See, e.g., Fuller v. Marx, 724 F.2d 717, 719 (8th Cir. 1984) (“Under Arkansas law, the next
of kin does have a quasi-property right in a dead body.”); Cohen v. Groman Mortuary, Inc., 41 Cal.
Rptr. 481, 483 (Dist. Ct. App. 1964) (recognizing the quasi-property right in a dead person’s body
“for the limited purpose of determining who shall have its custody for burial”); Burney v.
Children’s Hosp. in Bos., 47 N.E. 401, 402 (Mass. 1897) (recognizing a quasi-right of property in a
dead body); Brown v. Maplewood Cemetery Ass’n, 89 N.W. 872, 879 (Minn. 1902) (“[W]hile a
dead body is not property, in the strict sense of the common law, it is a quasi property . . . .”);
Hackett v. Hackett, 26 A. 42, 43 (R.I. 1893) (recognizing a widow had a quasi-property right in
her dead husband’s body).
229 See, e.g., Hackett, 26. A. at 43 (“This is not a question of contract, nor of liability, but of
sentiment and propriety.”); Pierce v. Proprietors of Swan Point Cemetery, 10 R.I. 227, 237-38
(1872) (“[T]here is no right of property in a dead body . . . . Yet the burial of the dead is a
subject which interests the feelings of mankind to a much greater degree than many matters of
actual property.”).
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underemphasized normative goals into an area of law. It is therefore indelibly a
form of normative change in the law.
*

*

*

While the three mechanisms of normative change described here may not
exhaust the entire gamut of mechanisms through which the common law works
in normative change, they do nonetheless represent the most prominent and
commonly seen mechanisms. In addition, common law courts invariably weigh
a variety of different considerations when choosing amongst them, such as the
extensiveness of the intended change, the acceptance of judicial lawmaking
within the area, the driving force behind the change in exogenous normative
conditions, the likelihood of its persistence over time and context, and their
ability to analogize to other areas where such change has been brought about.
Upon a weighing of these considerations, common law courts then embark
upon one or more of the previously described strategies, occasionally employing
them in tandem. In addition, as noted before, the dynamics of the mechanisms
at issue are often fairly subtle, with courts rarely ever making their reliance on a
particular mechanism explicit or obvious. The table below represents a simple
comparison of the three methods described in this Section.
Table 1: Comparing the Mechanisms of Change
Interpretive
Change

Interconceptual
Change

Additive
Change

Method of
Change

Interpretation

Salience alteration

Novel addition

Subtlety of
Process

Very subtle

Less subtle and
somewhat direct

Overt

Endurance
of Change

Subtlety risks
short-lived
change

Directness ensures
some path
dependence

Most enduring since
express overruling
required
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III. IMPLICATIONS
Having described the structure of legal concepts, and the critical role that
they play in anchoring the common law, enabling normative change in
common law doctrines, and in grounding common law reasoning and legal
disagreement around a core minimum of shared understanding, this Part
addresses the implications and consequences that flow from our account. In
particular, we address three important implications that flow from our prior
analysis.
A. Conceptualism, Formalism, and Realism
Ever since Legal Realism has become a dominant mode of analysis
among American legal scholars in diverse subject areas, the study of the
common law as a coherent body of law has fallen out of favor.230 Individual
common law subjects such as property, torts, and contracts are discussed and
analyzed almost exclusively as merely embodying important normative goals
and ideals.231 The actual jural content of the common law as an integrated
body of law, embodied in its multifarious concepts and devices, is treated as
a largely contingent feature of the system.232 Additionally, all too often this
jural apparatus is conceived of as open to pure manipulation by courts and
litigants.233 Some even suggest that common law concepts are devoid of all
jural significance and independent meaning.234 One torts scholar’s argument
that the legal concept of foreseeability might as well be called “strawberry
shortcake,” because it is so open-ended as to be rendered altogether meaningless, is a particularly good (and extreme) example of this phenomenon.235 In
short, Legal Realism—at least in its extreme version—has succeeded in
230 See ALAN BRUDNER WITH JENNIFER M. NADLER, THE UNITY OF THE COMMON
LAW 48 (2d ed. 2013) (“The fragmentation of the common-law tradition has spawned a corresponding crisis in the intellectual endeavour to understand it.”).
231 See, e.g., John C.P. Goldberg, Introduction: Pragmatism and Private Law, 125 HARV. L.
REV. 1640, 1641-42 (2012) (describing this trend as the emergence of “brass tacks” pragmatism).
232 Dworkin put it best when he characterized followers of this approach as “nominalists.” See
Ronald M. Dworkin, Is Law a System of Rules?, in ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 25, 26-27
(Robert S. Summers ed., 1968); see also MORRIS R. COHEN, LAW AND THE SOCIAL ORDER:
ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 208-47 (1982) (discussing previous uses of the term “nominalism”).
233 See L. L. Fuller, American Legal Realism, 82 U. PA. L. REV. 429, 434 (1934).
234 See, e.g., JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 27 (1930) (describing legal
concepts as “weasel words”).
235 See W. Jonathan Cardi, Purging Foreseeability: The New Vision of Duty and Judicial Power in
the Proposed Restatement (Third) of Torts, 58 VAND. L. REV. 739, 740 (2005) (“Indeed, one torts
professor teaches that foreseeability might as well be called ‘strawberry shortcake,’ having been
bent, muddled, and co-opted to such a degree that it has lost any real meaning.”).

2015]

Structure and Value in the Common Law

1295

having the jural and doctrinal mechanisms of the common law characterized
as altogether contingent features of the system.236 While a growing body of
scholars has sought to reverse this trend along the lines suggested by our
account here, the influence of Legal Realism remains pervasive in American
legal thinking.237
Despite its extreme aversion to formal concepts and doctrinal mechanisms, Legal Realism did have important lessons for the study and analysis
of law. In debunking the idea that legal reasoning could be altogether
autonomous, or that legal concepts could on their own provide judges with
answers in individual cases (“mechanical jurisprudence”238), it forced legal
scholars to look outside of the law for their analysis and to appreciate the
role that external influences play on the content, meaning, and application
of the law. 239 This lesson is without doubt an important and enduring
contribution of Legal Realism. Yet, when taken to its extreme, it came to be
understood as suggesting that legal analysis needed to look entirely to
external factors to understand the law, and that an internal analysis of the
law’s own concepts and devices was for the most part a misguided and
myopic enterprise.240
The rudimentary lessons of Legal Realism are nevertheless perfectly
compatible with recognizing an important role for concepts in legal analysis
and reasoning. As one prominent scholar notes, “there is no necessary
incompatibility between rigorous analysis of concepts and a realist
approach.” 241 This presumptively clear divide between the realists and
formalists—whether real or perceived242—has served to distract from the
functional role that legal concepts continue to play in common law reasoning
to this day; a role that nearly six decades of Legal Realist criticism have failed
to eliminate or even attenuate. The simple point remains that the choice
between formalism (in the sense of a “mechanical jurisprudence”) and realism

236
237

For an excellent discussion of these effects, see Fuller, supra note 233.
These scholars are part of the “New Private Law” school of thought. Goldberg, Introduction:
Pragmatism and Private Law, supra note 231, at 1640 n.1.
238 Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. R EV. 605, 617-21 (1908).
239 For an excellent account of Legal Realism and its influence on American legal theory, see
Brian Leiter, American Legal Realism, in THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF
LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 50, 54-56 (Martin P. Golding & William A. Edmundson eds., 2005).
240 See Fuller, supra note 233, at 443-47.
241 WILLIAM TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT 35-36 (2d
ed. 2012).
242 See TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 13-43 (arguing that “formalism” was almost entirely an
imaginary movement set up by the Legal Realists to make their point). But see Alfred L. Brophy,
Did Formalism Never Exist?, 92 TEX. L. REV. 383, 410 (2013) (reviewing TAMANAHA, supra note 1)
(characterizing Brian Tamanaha’s claims as “at best misleading; parts are outright wrong”).
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(in the sense of extreme rule or doctrine skepticism243) as modes of legal
analysis need not be binary. One can admit a role for legal concepts and
related doctrinal devices, while simultaneously acknowledging the presence
and significance of external influences on the meaning and application of
those concepts and devices. The duality of meaning that we described previously enables precisely such an intermediate position. It recognizes, on the
one hand, that the law’s concepts are not just contingent attributes of the
common law system, and on the other, that they are informed and reconstituted by ideals and influences from outside the legal system. The mere fact
that concepts are integral to the system need not endow them with autonomous significance to the decisionmaking process. To the contrary, recognizing
their limited importance in the process of reasoning to a decision in a case
allows for an important intermediary position between realism and formalism
as modes of legal analysis.
In our account, legal concepts are real, in the sense of being endowed
with a normativity of their own by virtue of their origin in the law, in turn
enabling them to play an important constraining effect on the form and
structure of legal reasoning, though not in its actual normative content.244
Acknowledging their realness by no means requires accepting that they
exclusively influence decisionmaking. Their constraining effect preserves a
level of continuity in the law and ensures a chain-novel-like rendering of
common law decisions.245 The mistake of the extreme Legal Realists lies in
their inability to recognize that legal concepts can play an important role in
the mode and style of common law reasoning, without deluding judges and
lawyers into a belief about their autonomous role.246
Legal concepts—and the pervasive conceptualism of the common law—
gives Legal Realism a distinctive style of reasoning and argumentation, which
allows judges to develop an element of continuity with the past, while
simultaneously enabling individual doctrines to keep up with changing needs
and preferences. And this is our core point: to the extent that common law
rule development is judge-made law, developed in a backward-looking process

243

See generally Richard A. Posner, The Jurisprudence of Skepticism, 86 MICH. L. REV. 827

(1988).
244 See generally Stephen A. Smith, The Normativity of Private Law, 31 OXFORD J. LEGAL
STUD. 215 (2011) (providing an account of the normative content of private law doctrine).
245 See DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 55, at 228-38 (relating how judges build upon
prior law to authors building upon the prior stories of other authors).
246 But see Brian H. Bix, Law as an Autonomous Discipline (noting the realist critique that the
law either could not or should not be formalist), in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LEGAL
STUDIES 975, 979 (Peter Cane & Mark Tushnet eds., 2003); Cohen, supra note 2, at 821 (arguing
that formalist reasoning leads to nonsensical results).
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from the context of individual disputes, conceptualism will remain a core
attribute of the system.247 Rather than working as a system of active deception, legal concepts serve the all-important role of grounding common law
analysis in a common language that has been essential to its persistence over
time and context. Common law judges who rely on legal concepts are hardly
delusional or misguided, and certainly do not believe that such concepts are
wholly autonomous. Legal concepts are instead the vehicle that the common
law uses to justify judicial lawmaking, which must inevitably balance the past,
present, and future all at once.248
Even when they acknowledge a role for legal concepts, prominent accounts
of common law reasoning view such concepts and their purported meaning as a
veritable distraction, rather than as an integral part of the system’s machinery.
Consider Edward Levi’s famous account of legal reasoning.249 A prominent
Legal Realist, Levi saw common law reasoning as originating in the process of
analogy.250 Unlike other realists, however, he admitted that legal concepts were
routinely used in such reasoning. Concepts could thus evolve to have a “limiting
influence—so much so that the reasoning may even appear to be simply
deductive.”251 He puts the point most starkly when he therefore notes that
it is not simply deductive. In the long run a circular motion can be seen.
The first stage is the creation of the legal concept which is built up as cases
are compared. . . . The second stage is the period when the concept is
more or less fixed, although reasoning by example continues to classify
items inside and out of the concept. The third stage is the breakdown of the
concept, as reasoning by example has moved so far ahead as to make it clear
that the suggestive influence of the word is no longer desired.252

The centrality of “reasoning by example,” to Levi, causes common law
courts to eventually realize the futility of their reliance on concepts and
abandon an established concept altogether in favor of pure analogy.253 As an
example of this cycle, Levi offers up the series of cases developing the idea
of “inherently dangerous” products, which culminated in Judge Cardozo’s
247 For the problems associated with common law rule development, see Frederick Schauer,
Is the Common Law Law?, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 455, 458 (1989) (book review).
248 See Fuller, supra note 233, at 447 (“We shall have gone a long way toward ending the controversy concerning ‘nominalism’ if we can secure recognition for the plain fact that the inner mental
experience of the individual, however precious and ineffable it may be, is ‘conceptual’.”).
249 EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL R EASONING (1949).
250 See id. at 5 (“Reasoning by example in the law is a key to many things.”).
251 Id. at 8.
252 Id. at 8-9.
253 See id. at 9. Indeed he even argues that when this happens, such concepts embody “no
meaning.” Id.
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famous opinion in MacPherson v. Buick. 254 Levi argues that Cardozo’s
expansion of the concept resulted in its complete breakdown, with courts
then coming to realize the distinct advantage of pure analogical reasoning
over conceptualism.255 Yet what Levi seems to ignore altogether is that
Cardozo’s move—and that of later cases—was not simply the abandonment
of the old concept. It was, instead, the replacement of the old concept with a
broader and more pervasive one that continues to inform the area of law to
this day: the concept of the “duty.”256
Levi’s argument illustrates how theorists who are sympathetic to concepts
nonetheless see them as a distraction in the overall scheme of common law
reasoning rather than as integral to the system’s working. While reasoning by
example may indeed represent the way in which common law courts develop
and apply the law,257 courts continue to do so through the identification of
common patterns and ideas in cases, which they invariably come to rely on,
and develop legal concepts as the jural lenses through which they view the
facts that produce those very patterns.258
As Brian Tamanaha has recently argued, much of the Legal Realists’ ire
against formalism and conceptualism originated in the mistaken belief that the
common law was somehow wedded to the idea of the declaratory theory of
lawmaking, according to which judges never make the law themselves but
merely find the law in past decisions.259 Tamanaha’s evidence shows that even
in the supposed heyday of formalism, most lawyers and jurists readily
conceded that common law judges were actively making new law even when
they were not overtly modifying legal doctrine or replacing old rules with
newly constructed ones. 260 Common law reasoning (both then and now)
adopts a method that purports to minimize external doctrinal disruption while
simultaneously reaching results demanded by changing situations and contexts.
Indeed, it is this disconnect between the minimal (or lack of) extrinsic change
and the actual result in individual cases that seems to have produced the harsh
realist critique of formalism and its reliance on concepts.261 Despite this, as
Tamanaha rightly points out, “the common law has carried on for centuries
254
255
256

See id. at 10-27; see also MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
LEVI, supra note 249, at 24-27.
Goldberg & Zipursky, The Moral of MacPherson, supra note 13, at 1743 (arguing that the
concept of the duty was at the core of the decision in MacPherson).
257 For a useful summary, see Grant Lamond, Analogical Reasoning in the Common Law, 34
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 567 (2014).
258 Indeed, Levi too seems to concede this point. See LEVI, supra note 249, at 8 (“If the society
has begun to see certain significant similarities or differences, the comparison emerges with a word.”).
259 See TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 13-24.
260 See id. at 23-24.
261 See id. at 41.
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without visible alteration in method,”262 even while undergoing a great deal of
substantive and normative change. What this points to then is that the
common law’s reliance on conceptual thinking originates in its very structure
as a method of judicial lawmaking, which in turn necessitates realizing a
delicate balance between doctrinal stability and normative change. The rote
criticism of conceptualism in the common law misses this reality altogether.
Understanding the persistence of legal concepts in the vocabulary and
content of common law reasoning thus necessitates treating them as “real”
and endowed with their own functional significance that judges are aware of
and readily accept in the interests of continuity in the working of the law.
Now it might well be true that institutional considerations call into question
the very virtue of the common law as a method of rule development and
reasoning, insofar as it is believed that courts are “ill-equipped”263 to make
law. This is, however, a different question: so long as the common law
subsists, we contend that it will continue to develop by relying on legal
concepts.
B. Facilitating Normative Pluralism
An additional, important implication that flows from our previous analysis
relates to the common law’s ability to accommodate a multiplicity of normative
goals and values. Our analysis of how concepts work and their reliance on a
duality of meanings suggests that the common law adheres to a model of
functional pluralism. Unlike structural pluralism, functional pluralism posits
that common law institutions come to affirm and advance varying—and at
times, conflicting—normative values. It achieves this not simply by delineating
separate spheres of influence for each of these goals whereby each value is only
ever realized within the confines of an individual doctrinal area264 but instead
by enabling a doctrinal area to embrace different values, varying over time and
context. The normative meaning of legal concepts thus enables common law
doctrine to adapt itself to conflicting preferences and contexts, each of which
might demand a different normative value or ideal.
The open-endedness of common law concepts (i.e., their open texture)
should thus be seen as an active invitation from the common law to purveyors
of different ideals, values, and ideologies, who are called upon to interpret and
apply these concepts to individual cases and contexts using their preferred
normative ideal. Over time, these purveyors—value entrepreneurs, so to
262
263
264

Id. at 40.
Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 267 (1918) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
See, e.g., Dagan, supra note 143, at 1413.
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speak—who might be either judges, scholars, or lawyers, seek to ensure that
their chosen normative value comes to be instantiated in the normative
meaning of a legal concept, and that this instantiation acquires a level of
relative stability owing to stare decisis and the overall path dependence of
common law adjudication. Sometimes this entrepreneurship is successful, and
sometimes it is unsuccessful, especially in the face of openly competing
considerations. Consider, as an example of the latter, the Hand Formula in
tort law.265 Despite its advocates, in actual practice (i.e., as applied by courts),
the Hand Formula has been of limited influence in courts’ construction of the
normative meaning of the “duty of care” in negligence law.266 In its place, a
host of other fairness-based considerations seem to be more prevalent in
courts’ analyses. In this process, divergent considerations and values thus
compete with each other for salience and affirmation in the reasoning of
courts, with courts then seeking to resolve this facial incommensurability
through a process of practical reasoning from within the context of the
dispute—a hallmark of common law adjudication.
Incommensurability refers to the idea that plural values are often times
hard to compare against each other, owing to the lack of a common measure
along which to undertake the comparison.267 This phenomenon is “more
apparent in the law than anywhere else,” 268 and the common law in particular
is often singled out as being especially susceptible to the problem of incommensurability given the range of activities and contexts to which it is applied.
At the same time though, the common law is also held out by scholars and
theorists as embodying what is perhaps the best known approach to solving the
problem of incommensurability: practical reasoning (or practical wisdom).269
265 See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (“[I]f the probability be called P; the injury, L; and the burden, B; liability depends upon whether B is less than L
multiplied by P: i.e., whether B < PL.”).
266 See Richard W. Wright, Hand, Posner, and the Myth of the “Hand Formula,” 4 THEORETICAL
INQUIRIES L. 145, 151-52 (2003) (recognizing that even in opinions that purport to apply the test, the
actual reasoning or results are never based on the test itself); see also Ronald J. Allen & Ross M.
Rosenberg, Legal Phenomena, Knowledge, and Theory: A Cautionary Tale of Hedgehogs and Foxes, 77 CHI.KENT L. REV. 683, 699 (2002) (“Courts do not rely heavily on the Hand Formula . . . .”).
267 See James Griffin, Incommensurability: What’s the Problem? (discussing the various theoretical and
colloquial ways that “incommensurability” is used), in INCOMMENSURABILITY, INCOMPARABILITY,
AND PRACTICAL REASON 35, 35 (Ruth Chang ed., 1997); Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and
Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 779, 795-96 (1994) (positing a definition of incommensurability).
268 Brett G. Scharffs, Adjudication and the Problems of Incommensurability, 42 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1367, 1410 (2001).
269 See, e.g., ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE
LEGAL PROFESSION 21 (1995) (noting the “ancient common-law reverence for the virtue of
practical wisdom,” which entails “a subtle and discriminating sense of how the (often conflicting)
generalities of legal doctrine should be applied to concrete disputes”); Stephen R. Perry, Judicial
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At its simplest, practical reasoning refers to the process of deliberating
about choices that result in action. Practical reason is “concerned not with
matters of fact and their explanation, but with matters of value, of what it
would be desirable to do . . . , [and with making reasoning agents] assess
and weigh their reasons for action, the considerations that speak for and
against alternative courses of action that are open to them.”270 To Aristotle,
practical reasoning was thus reasoning that resulted in, or was directed at
resulting in, action.271 Given its focus on action, one of the characteristic
features of practical reasoning is therefore its indelible connection to the
specifics of the situation necessitating the choice in question.272
As a solution to incommensurability, practical reasoning therefore adopts
what philosophers have described as the pragmatic theory of value,273 rooted
in the idea that “the meaning of a statement is exhausted by its practical
implications.”274 Accordingly, it entails examining how a given value, when
applied to a particular situation, produces a set of consequences. The
decisionmaker must then compare and contrast those consequences to
examine their overall acceptability. Practical reasoning thus recognizes the
centrality of making a choice among competing values situationally. As the
philosopher David Wiggins puts it, practical reason is in the end a “judgment
that one course of action is better than another,”275 rather than an avoidance
of such judgment, or an attempt to decide by reference to single value or
end, referred to as “monism.”276 Practical reasoning is thus indelibly a form
of pluralism.
Legal concepts facilitate the process of practical reasoning through their
duality of meaning. While the jural meaning of a concept operates as structural
constraint that guides the nature of the court’s inquiry, the normative meaning
inevitably involves a choice among competing considerations and values, which
Obligation, Precedent and the Common Law, 7 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 215, 220-21 (1987)
(investigating the nexus between practical reason and precedent).
270
R. Jay Wallace, Practical Reason, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL.,
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/practical-reason/ (last updated Mar. 26, 2014), archived at
http://perma.cc/D8P6-LP52.
271 See generally NORMAN O. DAHL, PRACTICAL R EASON, ARISTOTLE , AND WEAKNESS
OF THE WILL (1984); M. T. Thornton, Aristotelian Practical Reason, 91 MIND 57 (1982).
272 See David Wiggins, Incommensurability: Four Proposals, in INCOMMENSURABILITY,
INCOMPARABILITY, AND PRACTICAL REASON, supra note 267, at 52, 61-62.
273 See Elizabeth Anderson, Practical Reason and Incommensurable Goods, in INCOMMENSURABILITY, INCOMPARABILITY, AND PRACTICAL REASON, supra note 267, at 90, 91-95.
274 Id. at 90.
275 David Wiggins, Weakness of Will Commensurability, and the Objects of Deliberation and Desire,
79 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y (n.s.) 251, 274 (1979) (emphasis added).
276 Ruth Chang, Introduction to INCOMMENSURABILITY, INCOMPARABILITY, AND
PRACTICAL REASON, supra note 267, at 1, 16.
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the court must undertake through the lens of the particular facts involved in
the case, rather than merely by adhering to some normative pre-commitment.
Indeed, this reality perhaps explains why some judges, who in their scholarly
contexts remain committed to certain foundational values, are nonetheless
openly “pragmatic” and potentially pluralist in their decisionmaking in
individual cases.277 Practical reasoning in this sense has often been described by
legal theorists as the nascent “craft” that underlies common law adjudication,
which helps influence judges’ choice among competing normative ideas
underlying the working of abstract rules, and in turn the competing normative
meanings contained in a legal concept.278 Karl Llewellyn described this ideal
most forcefully in his account of the common law:
The existence of a craft means the existence of some significant body of
working knowhow, centered on the doing of some perceptible kind of
job. . . . [E]very live craft has much more to it than any rules describe;
the rules not only fail to tell the full tale, taken literally they tell much of it
wrong; and while words can set forth such facts and needs as ideals, craftconscience, and morale, these things are bodied forth, they live and work,
primarily in ways and attitudes which are much more and better felt and
done than they are said.279

The duality of meaning underlying legal concepts reinforces the craft of
practical reasoning that is central to the working of the common law. It
compels judges to balance jural and normative meaning, while understanding
the latter in terms of the normative goals best suited to the particular case at
hand. Those demands originate from a variety of considerations—situational
and institutional (e.g., precedent)—and yet allow for the process of choice to
be reasoned. In this sense, then, the very idea of a concept’s normative
meaning is determined situationally, in pragmatic and reflective fashion rather
than in the abstract, or in isolation from the demands of the case. The common
law, as Holmes famously observed, “decides the case first and determines the
principle afterwards.”280 Choosing among plural normative considerations in

277 See RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 230-31 (2008) (describing the inevitability of pragmatic adjudication among judges); Levmore, supra note 43, at 1793 (arguing that
Posner the academic is theoretical, while Posner the judge is a “minimalist”).
278 See, e.g., ALLAN C. HUTCHINSON, EVOLUTION AND THE COMMON LAW 4 (2005); Hanoch
Dagan, The Realist Conception of Law, 57 U. TORONTO L.J. 607, 637 (2007). See generally Amnon
Reichman, The Dimensions of Law: Judicial Craft, Its Public Perception, and the Role of the Scholar, 95
CALIF. L. REV. 1619 (2007); Brett G. Scharffs, Law as Craft, 54 VAND. L. REV. 2245 (2001).
279 KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 214 (1960).
280 Codes, and the Arrangement of the Law, 5 AM. L. REV. 1, 1 (1870), reprinted in Felix Frankfurter,
The Early Writings of O. W. Holmes, Jr., 44 HARV. L. REV. 717, 725 (1931).
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the common law is therefore a contextual process embedded within the
interpretation and application of legal doctrines to factual situations and occurs
on a routine basis through the process of giving normative meaning to legal
concepts.
The process of determining the normative meaning of a legal concept is
rarely ever done in a purely deductive fashion where a court reasons from
first principles to the individual concept and its application. Instead, the
process is largely dialogic and moves between the preferred outcome in the
individual case and the general principle that explains or justifies the
decision.281 Emily Sherwin describes this “natural reasoning” in the common
law as a process where “[t]he judge begins with an intuitive judgment about
the best outcome for the case, then formulates a more general principle that
supports the initial intuition.”282 Having done this, “[t]he judge then tests
the principle by considering other instances to which it might apply and
adjusts both principle and intuition to reach an acceptable accommodation.”283 Thus the normative meaning of a legal concept takes shape through
a combination of inductive, deductive, and analogical methods; but it begins
with the fundamental recognition that the concept—and the doctrine that it
is embedded within—must play a role in deciding the case at hand. It is, in
other words, constrained very heavily by the primary purpose for which it is
being discerned, rather than as a purely philosophical or ideological matter.
Gleaning the normative meaning of a legal concept to reach a decision is the
very process of practical reasoning that the common law is believed to
embody.
For this reason, legal concepts contribute to a form of practical reasoning
that is openly pluralist in structure and orientation. Additionally, this
pluralism—which is functional in nature—is dynamic, rather than static.
Legal concepts can affirm a multitude of different normative values and ideas
sequentially, over time and context. Because the triggers of normative
change—such as changing socioeconomic needs, preferences, or judicial
predispositions—originate externally to legal doctrine itself, proponents of
specific normative values and ideals are always at liberty to offer a normative
account of a legal concept that comports with those values and ideals. This is
not to suggest that there is no stability whatsoever in the normative meaning
of concepts over time. To the contrary, institutional attributes of common law
281 See generally Frederick Schauer, Do Cases Make Bad Law?, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 883 (2006)
(describing and critiquing the dialogic process); Emily Sherwin, Judges as Rulemakers, 73 U. CHI.
L. REV. 919 (2006) (defending the dialogic process).
282 Emily Sherwin, Common Law Reasoning and Cybertrespass, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
AND THE COMMON LAW 252, 258 (Shyamkrishna Balganesh ed., 2013).
283 Id.
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decisionmaking ensure that the normative goals of the common law remain
minimally stable but partake of a dynamism and generativity. Our account
therefore concretizes the common law’s essential structure as a functionally
pluralist institution.
C. Legal Concepts as Anchors in Normative Legal Reasoning
Our final claim concerns the indispensability of legal concepts to normative
theorizing in the law. Specifically, we contend that normative theories of law
cannot proceed in a free-floating manner; rather, they must be moored to
legal concepts. In our view, it is not accidental that efficiency-minded scholars
do not simply post a general call to “maximize welfare.” Nor is it surprising
that theorists who believe that the paramount value is justice do not settle for
a call to do “what is just.” We posit that any normative discourse of the law or
legal reforms, typically both will—and should—rely on legal concepts.
Consider the following example.
The “Hand Formula,” developed by Judge Learned Hand in his opinion in
United States v. Carroll Towing Co.,284 purported to introduce a cost–benefit
analysis into negligence law and is commonly considered an attempt to move
the normative orientation of negligence analysis towards efficiency.285 Yet even
when offering up his famous equation—“B < PL”—Judge Hand categorically
noted that he was doing so to give content to the very concept of duty, and not
liability for negligence in the abstract.286 Or, as he observed: “[T]he owner’s
duty, as in other similar situations, to provide against resulting injuries is a
function of three variables.” 287 Judge Hand could easily have noted that
liability for negligence in the abstract derives from his calculus. Instead, he
characterized his argument in terms of duty, central to the negligence analysis.
Thus, concepts anchor normative reasoning in the law.
Our argument echoes the position espoused by John Goldberg and
Benjamin Zipursky in the context of tort law.288 In their critique of Justice
Holmes’s skepticism of the concept of duty and William Prosser’s subsequent proposal to replace existing negligence doctrine with an open-ended
cost–benefit analysis that compares alternative liability regimes, Goldberg
and Zipursky note that the Holmes–Prosser model suffers from several
284
285

159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
For leading accounts, see Stephen G. Gilles, The Invisible Hand Formula, 80 VA. L. REV.
1015 (1994); Wright, supra note 266.
286 Carroll Towing, 159 F.2d at 173.
287 Id. (emphasis added).
288 See Goldberg & Zipursky, The Moral of MacPherson, supra note 13, at 1740-43 (identifying
problems with the Holmes–Prosser paradigm of negligence liability).
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deficiencies.289 First, from an institutional standpoint, there is strong reason
to believe that the legislative and executive branches are better suited to
engage in policymaking while considering all relevant factors.290 Second, a
negligence model that is based on open-ended cost–benefit analysis gives rise
to the specters of arbitrariness, indeterminacy, and doctrinal instability.291
Furthermore, as they point out, the transformation of negligence law into an
unconstrained policy analysis “threatens to drain the analytic structure from
torts.”292 Third, and most importantly, it would sever the crucial connection
between law, morality, and responsibility, a connection that is vital to the
successful operation of the law.293 This final point warrants elaboration.
In a series of articles, Goldberg and Zipursky have mounted a defense of
the concept of duty by placing it in the broader context of the human
experience. Legal concepts and norms are deeply rooted in the concept of
responsibility sustained by social interactions. On this view, law reflects, as
well as reshapes, “the basic obligations that persons owe to various others as
they go about their lives.”294 Goldberg and Zipursky maintain that the “law
is as much education, explication, articulation, and reinforcement as it is
command or threat.”295 Legal concepts, therefore, are informed by interpersonal interactions and daily experiences. They are familiar to individuals
and entail the same kind of thinking and behavior as required in social and
personal settings. 296 In this view then, legal concepts perform the allimportant role of translating the demands and requirements of social
interaction into normative ideas that form the basis of the legal system’s
construction of responsibility and liability.
In other work, Thomas Merrill and Henry Smith have advanced a similar
theory connecting property law to conventional perceptions of morality.297
They make the dual claim that any sustainable property system must be
“infused with moral significance” 298 and that the U.S. property system
289
290
291
292
293
294

Id. at 1753-61.
See id. at 1740.
See id. at 1741.
Id.
See id. at 1742-43.
John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Accidents of the Great Society, 64 MD. L. REV.
364, 391-92 (2005). For other work in this vein, see John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky,
Seeing Tort Law from the Internal Point of View: Holmes and Hart on Legal Duties, 75 FORDHAM L. REV.
1563 (2006); Goldberg & Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, supra note 36; and John C.P. Goldberg &
Benjamin C. Zipursky, Tort Law and Moral Luck, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 1123 (2007).
295 Goldberg & Zipursky, Accidents of the Great Society, supra note 294, at 392.
296 See id. at 367.
297 See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Morality of Property, 48 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1849 (2007).
298 Id. at 1850.
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embodies a moral perspective at its core.299 Merrill and Smith view property
as “a device for coordinating both personal and impersonal interactions over
things.”300 As rights in rem that avail against the rest of the world and turn all
individuals into duty-bearers vis-à-vis property owners, property rights “must
be communicated to a wide and disparate group of potential violators,”301 in a
clear manner impervious to misinterpretation.302 This means that all the
subjects of a particular legal system must be aware of the restrictions imposed
upon them by various property doctrines.
Property can achieve this goal only if its doctrines overlap with widespread
moral conventions that exist in the relevant community. Merrill and Smith
proceed to demonstrate their thesis by analyzing various property
doctrines.303 Like Goldberg and Zipursky, Merrill and Smith highlight the
interdependence between law and other norms and responsibilities that
regulate human behavior and actions. For Merrill and Smith, though, morality
is prior to law, but law—through its legal devices and concepts—is seen to
play the role again of converting the ideals of social and conventional morality
into independent legal constraints.
But the problem with free-floating decisionmaking free of doctrinal
constraints runs even deeper. Even if it were in principle desirable for courts
and individual actors to engage in abstract policy analysis, it would likely be
impracticable. As Herbert Simon famously noted, individuals cannot be
reasonably expected to evaluate all the possible outcomes of a policy or legal
rule because individuals do not have access to all the relevant information, and
they could not process and evaluate it if they did.304 As a result, individuals
often rely on heuristics when facing complex choices. 305 Heuristics allow
decisionmakers to make mental shortcuts that simplify complex decisions.
The use of heuristics is not limited to financial or economic decisions.
Heuristics have been shown to guide individuals when they are faced with

299
300
301
302
303
304

See id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
See id. at 1871-84.
See HERBERT A. SIMON, A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice (describing the implausibly
rigorous cognitive demands of calculating the most rational choice), in MODELS OF MAN, SOCIAL
AND RATIONAL: MATHEMATICAL ESSAYS ON RATIONAL HUMAN BEHAVIOR IN A SOCIAL
SETTING 241, 244-48 (5th prtg. 1967).
305 See generally GERD GIGERENZER ET AL., SIMPLE HEURISTICS THAT MAKE U S
SMART (1999) (exploring the use of heuristics in a variety of contexts).
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moral dilemmas.306 Similarly, heuristics have been posited to play a significant
role in the law.307
The common law’s concepts serve as heuristics that facilitate decisionmaking by individual actors and judges within the common law system.
Consider once again the concept of “reasonableness.” While actors may not
have the mental resources or the information to arrive at ideal philosophical
solutions that take into account all possible outcomes and justice
considerations, individuals can still figure out what constitutes reasonable
behavior in a particular set of circumstances. They understand that the law or
rule is asking for a normative evaluation of an action or outcome based on the
individual’s own internal calculus. Similarly, actors have a plausible sense of
what “good faith” means based on their everyday interactions and general life
experience. At the very least, actors can determine what kinds of behavior in
their opinion amount to “bad faith” and avoid them.
The principal virtue of heuristics is also their main vice. While some
scholars have lauded the use of heuristics, explaining that they enable fast
decisionmaking and lead to largely accurate decisions, others critique
heuristics’ tendency to oversimplify complex problems and lead individuals to
answer the wrong question. In moral contexts, some scholars are even more
openly critical of the use of heuristics.308 Sunstein, for example, argues that
the use of heuristics often leads us astray by blinding us to the possibility of
better, though more complex, solutions to moral problems.309 This criticism of
heuristics largely misses the point. Heuristic-based decisionmaking was born
out of necessity. In an ideal world, actors could be expected to immerse
themselves in the difficult dilemmas of moral philosophy or welfarism. In the
real world, actors do not have the resources or mental capacity to do so. As
Simon famously observed, we do not optimize; we satisfice, that is, we reach
decisions that are good enough.310

306 See generally, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Moral Heuristics, 28 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 531 (2005)
(providing examples of the use of heuristics to guide moral decisionmaking).
307 See generally HEURISTICS AND THE LAW (Gerd Gigerenzer & Christoph Engel eds., 2006)
(collecting literature on the use of heuristics in the law); MARK KELMAN, THE HEURISTICS
DEBATE (2011) (discussing the legal implications of the debate between those who characterize
heuristics as an error-producing form of bias and those who view them as a tool for fast and frugal
decisionmaking).
308 See generally, e.g., Russell Korobkin, The Problems with Heuristics for Law (noting that heuristics
in the law may prevent actors from maximizing their utility or reduce the effectiveness of policy
incentives), in HEURISTICS AND THE LAW, supra note 307, at 45.
309 See generally Sunstein, Moral Heuristics, supra note 306. But see generally Jeffrey J. Rachlinksi,
Heuristics, Biases, and Philosophy, 43 TULSA L. REV. 865 (2007) (critiquing Sunstein’s arguments).
310 SIMON, supra note 304, at 261 (distinguishing satisficing from optimizing and maximizing).
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The question thus becomes: are our legal heuristics good enough, or can
they be improved? Let us be clear that we do not argue that common law
concepts—insofar as they function as heuristic devices—are perfect. We
readily admit the possibility that some common law concepts could have
been substituted by other concepts that can better function as heuristics.
Indeed, as we discussed previously, some legal concepts are deemphasized
over time and others are practically abandoned or retired. Likewise, the
normative meaning of common law concepts is routinely reshaped and
updated. Nonetheless, it is entirely possible that legislatures and judges
could devise better legal heuristics. Indeed, we see the generative perfectionism of the common law as striving to achieve this ideal.
Our claim is therefore hardly that the heuristic function of the law’s
existing concepts is perfect; indeed it is far more modest. In keeping with
Simon’s idea of satisficing, we suggest that common law concepts constitute
heuristics that allow individuals and courts to reach satisfactory, albeit at
times imperfect, decisions. Common law concepts have survived the test of
time. They embody centuries of legal experience and closely approximate
the values of our society. Moreover, thanks to their unchanging jural
meaning, they constitute clear guideposts for the individual members of our
society. As far as courts are concerned, concepts contain the lore of multiple
judicial decisions. Judges, when faced with a new case, frame the facts
involved around the legal issues that they identify and for which the
common law’s conceptual machinery provides them with a useful and
effective toolkit. The existence of these concepts not only ensures certainty
and continuity in the law but also allows the system to operate efficiently. If
judges had to approach every case afresh, without any judicial baselines or
reference points, they would have to act not only as judges but also as
legislators. Judges simply do not have the mental and material resources to
perform this task. Such a system would also increase the number of appeals
and require appellate courts to approach every case de novo. A major
implication that therefore flows from our account is the recognition that
normative proposals to reform and modify the law would do well to rely on
the conceptual architecture of the law.311
It bears emphasizing that in claiming that legal concepts work as heuristic
devices in legal reasoning, we should not be taken to suggest that concepts
perform an exclusively instrumental role and are therefore not endowed with
311 This is not to say that all normative theories of the law must have a bottom-up structure
in the sense that they must grow out of the common law concepts. It is equally possible to start
with an abstract top-down theory, but at some point a normative theory should address how it is to
be operationalized through the conceptual machinery of the law.
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internal meaning of their own. Quite to the contrary, our claim here is that
their very ability to function as heuristics derives in large part from their
being endowed with their own meaning, as a result of which actors and
judges use them to situate and ground their normative reasoning in the
law.312 Indeed our claim here is that the very jural meaning of legal concepts,
which remain sufficiently stable over time, functions as a heuristic device that
enables courts and litigants to rationalize the facts involved in their dispute
into particular patterns and ideas, evaluate them, and undertake a process of
reasoning and decisionmaking. The grounding effect of legal concepts as
heuristic devices is therefore very much tied to the reality that they do
embody their own discernible meaning.
CONCLUSION
Writing during the heyday of Legal Realism, the noted legal theorist
Lon Fuller, himself a realist, cautioned scholars that the “crusade against”
conceptual thinking in the law was going “too far.”313 Fuller’s cautionary note
seems to have had little influence on American common law thinking, where
the use and analysis of legal concepts continues to be vilified.314 Indeed, on
occasion, even the justices of the U.S. Supreme Court have criticized conceptual thinking (or “conceptualism”), deriding it as “obsolete”315 and “long ago
discarded.”316 Much of this ire, we have sought to show, originates in a
fundamental misunderstanding about the role of legal concepts in the
common law.
As we have argued, admitting a role for concepts in legal reasoning and
analysis does not collapse into a formalist enterprise, contrary to common
understanding. By virtue of their “duality of meaning,” legal concepts—
much like most other elements of legal reasoning—remain open to being
infused with normative values and ideals from a wide range of disciplines,
ideologies, and perspectives. All the same, this process does not drain them
of all meaning, for they continue to embody at all times a core structural
framework that gives them a determinate jural content across time, place,
and context. We characterized the former as the concept’s normative

312 For prior efforts to understand the role of concepts through the lens of heuristics and
information-processing, see Smith, supra note 47.
313 Fuller, supra note 233, at 443.
314 See, e.g., Jay M. Feinman, Un-Making Law: The Classical Revival in the Common Law, 28
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1, 55-56 (2004) (describing the classical revival of laws as a “conceptual
regress”).
315 Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 354 (1969) (Fortas, J., dissenting).
316 Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74, 81 (1958).
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meaning, and the latter as its jural meaning. It is only when the two are seen
as equally indispensable elements of a concept’s “meaning” that the true role
of legal concepts in the common law becomes apparent.
The duality of meaning that underlies legal concepts holds deep functional
significance in the common law. As we have shown, it is entirely through the
duality of meaning that the common law is able to maintain its delicate balance
between stability and change. The jural meaning of concepts allows the
common law’s doctrinal content to remain relatively stable and unchanging
over time, while their normative meaning allows it to affirm and endorse
competing normative values, in the process enabling the common law to keep
up with changing social preferences.
Indeed, a central element of our argument has been that understanding
the common law’s conceptual architecture is critical to appreciating not just
how the common law works but, in addition, what the common law actually is.
As a method (and body) of judge-made law, developed from the context of
individual cases with uniquely different fact patterns and normative demands,
the common law requires a textured approach to legal rules and reasoning that
allows it to provide future actors with sufficient guidance and predictability,
while at the same time decide the individual case at hand by reference to
existing law. Legal concepts offer common law courts and judges an ideal
mechanism by which to realize these twin goals without undermining the
overall legitimacy of the legal system. It is in fact the common law’s conceptual
framework that is, in large part, responsible for its vitality as a method of
lawmaking and legal reasoning for several centuries now.
The renowned common law theorist Sir Frederick Pollock famously tried to
identify the “genius of the common law” in a series of lectures delivered at the
turn of the century. 317 Pollock identified a host of characteristics that he
believed explained the subsistence, expansion, and continuing vitality of the
common law as a body of law. As a method of lawmaking and legal reasoning,
though, the true genius of the common law is perhaps to be found in its
undying commitment to its conceptual edifice, which has survived the test of
time and outlived the diatribes of its critics. In the end, rather than representing
a form of “transcendental nonsense,” as Felix Cohen famously put it, legal
concepts in the common law exhibit a lure, simplicity, and indefatigability that
can be explained only by their “transcendent common sense.”

317

See FREDERICK POLLOCK, THE GENIUS OF THE COMMON LAW (1912).

